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INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine requires United States courts to refrain from
questioning the validity of acts done by a foreign sovereign within its own
territory. ' This seemingly simple statement has caused hopeless confusion
in the courts, 2 has aroused endless scholarly debate, 3 and has provoked
1. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 179-217.
3. "[Tjhe act of state doctrine [is] perhaps the most written-about topic in international law journals
in this country since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in [Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964)]. " The InternationalRule ofLawAct: Hearingon S. 1434 Before the Subcomm. on
CrininalLaw of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981) [hereinafter Act of
State Hearings] (testimony of Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser to the Department of State). Some
notable examples include R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

ORDER (1964) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER]; R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1970) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY]; Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State
Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986); Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected:TheAct ofState Doctrine
in the Revised Restatement of U.S. ForeignRelationsLaw, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68 (1985); Henkin, Act of
State Today:Recollections in Tranquility,6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 175 (1967) [hereinafter Recollections in Tranquility]; Henkin, The ForeignAffairs Power of the FederalCourts: Sabbatino, 64 CotU.
L. REV. 805 (1964) [hereinafter Foreign Affairs]; Mathias, Restructuringthe Act of State Doctrine:A
Blueprintfor Legislative Reform, 12 LAW & POt'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); Zander, The Act of State
Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Comment, The Act of State Doctrine:A History of Judicial

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
vehement criticism from the bar.4 Recent cases applying the doctrine to
foreign sovereign acts affecting intangible property have raised the level of
conceptual confusion to new heights 5 and have triggered yet another flurry
6
of critical commentary.
A basic cause of confusion about the doctrine is that courts and commentators disagree about the nature and scope of the doctrine. 7 For instance, the
Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 677 (1977); Note, RehabilitationandExoneration of
the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. L INT'L L. & POL. 599 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Rehabilitation
and Exoneration];Note, Limiting theAct of State Doctrine:A LegislativeInitiative,23 VA. J. INT'L L.
103 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Limiting the Act of State].
4. A recent example is the reaction of the international bar to the Second Circuit's initial decision to
affirm a district court decision recognizing as an act of state Costa Rica's default on commercial loan
contracts with American banks. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, No.
83-7714 (2d Cir. April 23, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file), aff'g 566 F. Supp. 1440
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), withdrawn andvacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
The Second Circuit's initial decision was reported in the advance sheets at 733 F.2d 23 (copy on file with
the Washington Law Review), but was withdrawn from the bound volume after the Second Circuit
granted a rehearing.
The Second Circuit reversed its initial decision on rehearing, see infra note 199, but the initial
decision "created shock waves throughout the U.S. international banking community." Rendell, The
Allied Bank Case andIts Aftermath, 20 INT'L LAw. 819, 823 (1986); see, e.g., Brown, Enforcing bank
sovereign lending in New York, Int'l Fin. L. Rev., July 1984, at 5, 7 ("[tlhe decision took the
international banking community by storm"); Warden, Choice of Law and Act of State Questions in
InternationalBanking Transactions, in PRIVATE INVaSTORs ABRoAD-PRoBLEMs AND SOLuTiONS IN
INTERNATIONAL BusINEss IN 1984, at 300 (J. Moss ed. 1984) (decision may undermine "essential
premise [of] contractual undertakings" with foreign nations); see also Meissner, Crisisas an Opportunityfor Change:A Commentary on the DebtRestructuring Process, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
613, 626 (1985) (Second Circuit's initial Allied Bank decision is "threatening to New York as an
international financial center as well as the sanctity of contract law." (footnote omitted)).
5. See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. A.W. Galadari Commodities, 777 F.2d 877
(2d Cir. 1985); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764F. 2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Brakav. Bancomer, S.N.C.,
762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F2d 516 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d
Cir. 1984); Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460,463 N.E.2d 5,474 N.Y.S.2d 689, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984); see also infra text accompanying notes 179-217.
6. See, e.g., Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default: The Act of State Doctrine,
Sovereign Immunity, and Comity in InternationalBusiness Transactions, 19 INT'L LAw. 225 (1985);
Hoffman & Deming, The Role of the U.S. Courts in the TransnationalFlow of Funds, 17 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 493 (1985); Tigert, Allied Bank International: A UnitedStates Government Perspective, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 511(1985); Zaitzeff& Kunz, TheAct ofStateDoctrineandthe Allied
Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 449 (1985); Comment, Debt Situs and theAct ofState Doctrine:A Proposal
for a More Flexible Standard,49 ALB. L. REv. 647 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Debt Situs]; Note,
The Act ofState Doctrine:Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1986) [hereinafter
Note, Resolving Debt Situs]; Recent Developments, Act of State: Treatment of Foreign Defaults in
Domestic Courts, 25 HARv. INT'L L.J. 195 (1984); Note, Default on ForeignSovereignDebt: A Question
forthe Courts?, 18 IND. L. REv. 959 (1985); Comment, TheAct ofState DoctrineandForeignSovereign
Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New Focusfor a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469
(1985); Note, The Resolution ofActofStateDisputesInvolvingIndefinitelySituatedProperty,25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 901 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Indefinitely Situated Property].
7. See infra text accompanying notes 218-74.

399

Washington Law Review

Vol 62:397, 1987

doctrine has been called a special rule of choice of law, 8 a doctrine of
judicial deference based on the principle of separation of powers, 9 and a
doctrine of nonjusticiability similar to the political question doctrine.' 0
Critics of the act of state doctrine point out that the existence of these
inconsistent theories has confounded the courts II and judicial application
12
of these discordant theories has led to arbitrary and unjust results.

According to some critics, the act of state doctrine should be abolished
altogether. 13
This article proposes a new conception of the act of state doctrine. 14 The
basic approach of this new conception is that the act of state doctrine should
be analyzed in terms of international law principles governing a sovereign
state's 15 jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law. As used here, jurisdiction to
prescribe refers to the appropriate authority of a state "to make its law
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of
persons in things.' 6 In analyzing questions of prescriptive jurisdiction,
8. See Henkin, Recollections in Tranquility, supra note 3, at 178.
9. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
10. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 3, at 328-30, 334-58.
12. See Act of State Hearings, supra note 3, at 22 (statement of Prof. Don Wallace).
13. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 3, at 396-98; Wallace, Abolishing or Changing the Act of State
Doctrine by Legislation:Comments, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 25 (J. Lacy ed.
1983); see also Mathias, supra note 3, at 409-10 (proposing a statute that precludes application of the
act of state doctrine to any acts in violation of international law). Professor Bazyler suggests that courts
would fare better if they applied a number of existing legal doctrines that embody the same concerns
now animating the act of state doctrine. See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 384-92; see also Mathias, supra
note 3, at 408. The act of state doctrine has not won many defenders. One notable exception is Professor
Richard Falk. See, e.g., R. FALK, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 3, at 64-114.
Professors Henkin and Lowenfeld have stated that despite the critical opposition to the doctrine, it
will probably not disappear. See Henkin & Lowenfeld, Letter to the Editor,79 AM. J. INT'L L. 717, 718
(1985).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 337-43.
15. Section 201 of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6)] defines
"state" as follows:
Under international law, a "state" is an entity which has a defined territory and permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and which engages in, or has the capacity to
engage in, formal relations with other such entities.
During its annual meeting, held May 13-16, 1986, in Washington, D.C., the American Law Institute
(ALl) approved the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised). See Summary
ofProceedingsof Annual Meeting of American Law Institute, 54 U.S.L.W. 2593, 2595-96 (May 27,
1986). The ALl has yet to promulgate an official version of the new Restatement, and all references to
the new Restatement will be to its tentative draft form.
16. Jurisdiction to prescribe refers to a nation's ability "to make its law applicable to the activities,
relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive
act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court." RESTATEMENT
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 401(1); see also Lowenfeld, Jurisdictionto
Prescribe: Some ContributionsFrom an InternationalLawyer,4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 91,91-93 (1986). For
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this article employs the useful and important approach set forth by the
recently adopted Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
7
States (Revised).'
To illustrate this approach, suppose that a forum court is called upon to
resolve a dispute involving foreign sovereign acts. The court determines
that under international law the foreign legal system has the appropriate
authority to make its law applicable to those acts. 18 In this case, the foreign
sovereign has committed acts over which it has proper jurisdiction to
prescribe. The court of the forum state is bound to apply the law of the
foreign sovereign to determine the legal consequences of those acts and
may not question the results unless they are contrary to international law. 19
On the other hand, suppose that the forum court determines that under
international law the legal system of the forum state has the appropriate
authority to make its law applicable to the acts in question. In this case, the
foreign sovereign has committed acts over which the forum state has proper
jurisdiction to prescribe. 20 The legal status of the acts under the foreign
sovereign's own legal system is irrelevant to the adjudication of the dispute
by the forum court. 2 1 Rather, the legal consequences of the acts of the
foreign sovereign are determined solely by the laws of the forum state.
Otherwise, the foreign sovereign would, in effect, be amending legal
relationships that should be governed by the legal system of the forum state.
Since modern international law contemplates broad and overlapping
bases of jurisdiction to prescribe, both the forum and the foreign sovereign
will frequently have concurrent bases to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
over the same persons, things, or conduct. 22 In these cases, each sovereign
state should evaluate the relevant competing interests by a standard of
reasonableness and one state should defer to the other if the other state has a
23
greater interest at stake.

an analysis in terms ofjurisdiction to prescribe of acts of state affecting intangible property, see Note,
Indefinitely SituatedProperty, supra note 6.
17. See REsTTEmENT FOREIGN RLATONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402; REsTATEMENT
OF FOREwN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7)].
18. See infra text accompanying notes 389-415.
19. One major distinction between the proposed conception and the traditional conception of the
doctrine is that under the former, sovereign acts violating international law are not shielded from
judicial inquiry. For a justification of this position, see infra text accompanying notes 368-69.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 416-25.
21. The forum may, however, choose voluntarily to recognize the foreign law. See infra note 342.
22. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402 comment b;
see also infra text accompanying note 351.
23. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7), supra note 17, § 403(g); see also
infra text accompanying notes 355-56.
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Admittedly, in certain cases, an analysis in terms of jurisdiction to
prescribe will be scarcely easier than an analysis based upon a current
theory of the act of state doctrine. 24 Nonetheless, this approach can be
justified because it offers jurisprudential and legal advantages over the
current theories comprising act of state jurisprudence.
First, the doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe incorporates the descendants of positivist concepts of power and absolute territoriality-the original underpinnings of the act of state doctrine. 25 By building upon contemporary versions of the doctrine's original foundations, an analysis of the act
of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe remains faithful to the
doctrine's origins and accommodates the needs of the modern international
legal and economic order.
Second, jurisdiction to prescribe is a fundamental and powerful concept
that plays an increasingly important role as international business transactions multiply and nations, such as the United States, seek to regulate such
transactions across national boundaries. Developing agreed-upon rules of
prescriptive jurisdiction should enhance understanding of the extraterritorial reach of the federal antitrust and securities laws, an area where
attempts by the United States to exercise extensive prescriptive jurisdiction
has led to international tension and resentment. 26 In addition, the concept
of jurisdiction to prescribe has broad explanatory power. The act of state
doctrine and the doctrine of absolute and restrictive sovereign immunity,
now considered discrete and independent theories, can be analyzed under
this single, unified approach. 27 Also, most of the exceptions to the act of
state doctrine can be incorporated directly into the main analysis in terms of
jurisdiction to prescribe. 28 The development of a single and comprehensive
theory, applicable to areas now considered governed by independent legal
doctrines and exceptions, offers the advantages of economy and simplicity.
Third, the doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe is governed by rules of
international law, now recognized as part of the federal law of the United
States. 29 According to legal scholars, the act of state doctrine "is probably
the single most important reason for the arrested development of international law in the United States." 30 A theory of the act of state doctrine based
24. This does not mean that a clear solution cannot be found in most cases. See infra text
accompanying note 359.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 53-67.
26. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
27. For an analysis of restrictive sovereign immunity in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe, see
Singer, Abandoning RestrictiveSovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms ofJurisdictionto Prescribe.

26 HARV. ItNr'L L.J. 1 (1985); see also infra text accompanying notes 374-76.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 377-83.
29. See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text.
30. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 329.
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upon jurisdiction to prescribe will allow United States courts to contribute
to the development of international law. 31 Moreover, the proposed new
conception of the act of state doctrine satisfies the judicial concern that the
doctrine should be governed by federal law, a concern that has profoundly
32
influenced the doctrine's previous development.
Fourth, an act of state analysis in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe will
bring much needed analytical clarity to current act of state disputes involving intangible property and contract rights. Since traditional act of state
analysis offers little guidance in this area, courts and commentators propose conflicting and confusing new approaches to the application of the act
of state doctrine to sovereign defaults on private loans and sovereign
expropriations of foreign bank branches or deposits. 33 Moreover, given the
likelihood of increasing numbers of international business transactions
involving intangible property and contract rights, it will prove useful to
invest scholarly and judicial energy into developing principles regulating
the competence of nations to prescribe rules of law governing intangible
property."4
Part I of this article sets forth a history and development of theories of the
act of state doctrine. This section traces the major shifts in the jurisprudential and legal foundations of the doctrine that occurred between its birth in
the nineteenth century and its reemergence in the latter half of the twentieth
century. These shifts contributed to the development of incompatible
theories of the doctrine. Part II demonstrates that each of these current
theories is seriously flawed for various jurisprudential, legal, and practical
reasons. Part I first proposes and defends an analysis of the act of state
doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe, and argues that the proposed
new conception of the doctrine will serve a valuable and unique function in
the modern international legal order. Part HI then applies an act of state
analysis in terms ofjurisdiction to prescribe to major act of state cases and
to recent cases involving intangible property.

31. See infra text accompanying notes 386-88.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 90-98, 112-21.
33. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1985) (suggesting an
incidents of the debt analysis focusing on the likelihood that judicial examination of an act of state will
antagonize the foreign sovereign); Comment, Debt Situs, supranote 6, at 673-79 (setting forth various
links of territoriality to foreign sovereign as indicative of when judicial review will antagonize foreign
sovereign's reasonable expectations of dominion over debt); Note, Resolving Debt Situs, supra note 6,
at 605-06 (advocating an incidents of the debt analysis). For a fuller discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 275-306.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 384-85; see also infra note 458.
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I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF THE ACT
OF STATE DOCTRINE

A.

Positivist Concepts of Power andAbsolute Territoriality:Underhill
and the Vested Rights Theory of Choice of Law

Although the act of state doctrine 35 was foreshadowed by several Su36
preme Court cases in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the birth of the doctrine in the United States occurred in Underhill v.
Hernandez,37 decided by the Supreme Court in 1897.
George Underhill, a United States citizen living in Venezuela, operated a
waterworks system and machinery repair business. 38 When revolution
swept Venezuela in 1892, General Hernandez, military commander of the
ultimately successful revolutionary armies, detained Underhill and forced
him to operate the waterworks and repair business for the benefit of the
insurgents. 39 After his release, Underhill returned to the United States and
brought suit against Hernandez for false imprisonment and assault. 40 The
35.

The historical roots of the act of state doctrine can be traced to the doctrine of sovereign

immunity. See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (4th ed. 1982).

The system of sovereign immunity developed in twelfth century feudal England because there was no
way of enforcing law against kings, who controlled the courts. See I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 517-18 (2d ed. 1899); see also Hill, A PolicyAnalysis of the American Law of
Foreign State Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 211 (1981); Note, Act of State and Sovereign
Immunities Doctrines: The Need to Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 91, 93 (1982). As
monarchies declined and modern forms of government arose, act of state immunity was extended to
state officials acting on behalf of the state. Act of state immunity thus arose as an extension of the
immunity of the state that the officials represented. See M. AKEHURST, supra, at 109.
The first English cases to recognize the act of state doctrine as distinct from the doctrine of sovereign
immunity are Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674), and Duke of Brunswick v. King of
Hanover, 9 Eng. Rep. 993 (H.L. 1848).
36. See, e.g., The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283,336 (1822); L'Invincible, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 238, 253 (1816); Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294 (1808); Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230 (1796). The Supreme Court first recognized the act of state doctrine in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,762 (1972) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) ("The separate lines of
cases enunciating both the act of state and sovereign immunity doctrines have a common source in the
case of the The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon .
"). In The SchoonerExchange, Chief Justice
Marshall stated:
The arguments in favor of this opinion which have been drawn from the general inability of the
judicial power to enforce its decisions in cases of this description, from the consideration, that the
sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that
the questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than of law, that they
are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion, are of great weight, and merit serious attention.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
37. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
38. Id. at 251.
39. These facts are contained in the lower court opinion. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577,
578 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
40. 168U.S.at251.

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
United States Supreme Court held that General Hernandez was shielded
from liability because he was acting under authority of the de facto
government of Venezuela. 41 Chief Justice Fuller reasoned that "[t]he
immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts
done within their own states, in the exercise of governmental authority,
. . . must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by
42
paramount force as a matter of fact."
In the course of his opinion, Chief Justice Fuller articulated what has
come to be known as the "classic statement" 43 of the act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
means open to
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
44
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
The jurisprudential underpinnings of Underhill'sdictum 45 can be traced
to the vested rights theory of choice of law advocated in the United States
by Professor Joseph Beale 46 and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Under
Beale's formulation, "[a]'right having been created by the appropriate law,
the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere. . . . Thus an
act valid where done cannot be called in question anywhere." 47 According
to this theory, legal rights can exist only if they are created by the sovereign,
41. Id. at 253-54.
42. Id. at 252. Thus, commentators contend that the Underhilldecision could have relied upon the
doctrine of sovereign immunity alone and that Chief Justice Fuller's pronouncement of the act of state
doctrine is dictum. See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 332-33; Zander, supra note 3, at 830; Note,
Rehabilitationand Exoneration, supra note 3, at 603.
43. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972)
(plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) ("classic American statement") (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964)).
44. 168 U.S. at 252.
45. See supra note 42.
46. Professor Joseph H. Beale of the Harvard Law School was the chief proponent of the vested
rights theory in the United States, but the theory had an antecedent European proponent in A.V. Dicey,
whose Conflict of Laivs (1896) was the seminal choice of law treatise in England. Professor Cavers has
suggested that according to Dicey, "the task of the court in a choice-of-law case was the enforcement of
vested rights." R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRiu & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (3d ed. 1981) (quoting D.
CAvERs, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PRocEss 5 (1965)).
47. 3 J. BEALE, A SELECrON OF CASES ON THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS 517 (1902) (citations omitted).
Beale's views were heavily influenced by the English philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Austin.
See infra text accompanying notes 53-57. The theory that only the sovereign can create legal rights can
be traced back to Thomas Hobbes, who wrote:
The legislator in all commonwealths, is only the sovereign. . . . For the legislator is he that
maketh the law. And the commonwealth only prescribes, and commandeth the observation of
those rules, which we call law: therefore the commonwealth is the legislator. But the commonwealth is no person, nor has the capacity to do anything except by the representative, that is, the
sovereign; and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislator.
T. HOBBES, LEviATHAN 173 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946) (1651).
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and only the constitutive laws that created the legal rights can determine the
48
nature, scope, and validity of those rights.
Professor Beale's enormous influence was felt through his position as

reporter for the first Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, which
appeared in 1934, and his views were highly influential in the courts from
approximately 1900 to about 1950. 49 Beale found a champion for his theory

on the Supreme Court in Justice Holmes, 50 who, in 1909, stated a judicial
formulation of the vested rights theory in American Banana Co. v. United

Fruit Co. 51 In that case, the Supreme Court refused to hold a New Jersey
corporation liable under apparently applicable United States antitrust laws

for conspiring with government officials of Panama to monopolize the
Central American banana trade with the United States:
IT]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done. . . . The fundamental reason [for not invalidating a foreign act
of state] is that it is a contradiction in terms to say that, within its jurisdiction,
it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to bring about a result that it
declares by its conduct to be desirable and proper. . .. The very meaning of
52
sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law.
Beale and Holmes's views had their conceptual roots in John Austin's
enormously influential theory of positivist law. 53 Austin, a disciple of the
48. See 3 J. BEALE, supra note 47, at 501-04. Beale traced the judicial application of the vested
rights theory back to Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Consis. 54, 161 Eng. Rep. 665 (1811). An
Englishman, already married to a Scottish woman in Scotland, married another woman in England.
When the first wife sued to assert her marriage rights, the court had to decide whether Scottish or
English law applied. The court held:
Being entertained in an English Court, it must be adjudicated according to the principles of
English law. .-. . But the only principle applicable to such a case by the law of England is, that
the validity of [the first wife's] marriage rights must be tried by reference to the law of the country,
where if they exist at all, they had their origin . ..
IThe law of England . . . leaves the legal
question to the exclusive judgment of the law of Scotland.
Id. at 58-59, 161 Eng. Rep. at 667.
49.

See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 13-14 (1982).

50. Justice Holmes has been called "the most fanatical of vested rights fanatics." Schlesinger, A
RecurrentProblem in TransnationalLitigation:The Effect ofFailureto Invoke or Prove the Applicable
ForeignLaw, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1973). Some might contend that the title goes to Beale. See R.
CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 46, at 6 (labeling Beale as the "cataclysmic force in the
field of conflict of law in the early Twentieth Century").
51. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
52. Id. at 356, 358; see also Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473,478-79(1912); Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). The narrow holding ofAmerican Banana has been overruled. The
antitrust laws reach certain conspiracies even if part of the conduct occurred outside the United States.
See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962); United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927).
53. Professor Christie has stated that "[i]t is impossible to overemphasize the importance of Austin
in the development of legal philosophy in the English-speaking world." G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE
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English utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, 54 believed that only the sovereign can
create laws, a proposition he derived from a general theory about the nature
of law. Austin was one of the first philosophers to develop a comprehensive
theory about the nature of law and the nation-state, and had great influence
upon the development of legal philosophy in the English-speaking world. 55
Austin viewed law as the desire of the sovereign expressed in a command
that others behave in a certain way, backed by the sovereign's power and
will to sanction disobedience. 56 Austin provided the conceptual foundations for Beale's vested rights theory:
The impact of Bentham and Austin on. . . Beale is apparent. The view that
law has its source in sovereign command led to the statement that courts
always applied their own law. The same essential idea, that rights were the
creature of sovereign command, led to the theory of vested rights-rights57
created by a foreign sovereign but recognized and enforced by local law.
Under Austin's theory, the sovereign's power to enforce the law is the
ultimate source of legal obligation. What distinguishes a rule of law from
all other expressions of desire is that law is backed by the sovereign's
467 (1973). Austin is generally viewed as the founder of legal positivism, which is "now accepted in
one form or another by most working and academic lawyers who hold views on jurisprudence." R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 16 (1979). ProfessorH.L.A. Hart's version of legal positivism set
forth in The Concept ofLaw (1961) is now generally regarded as the most powerful expression of the
theory. See R. DWORKIN, supra, at 16; see also J. MURHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHILosoPHY OF LAW 31
(1984). While legal positivism is associated with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the roots ofthe
doctrine can be traced far back in the intellectual history of mankind. See G. CHRISTIE, supra, at 292.
Legal positivism holds two fundamental tenets. First, the law of a community is a set of posited rules
that derives its binding force from the dominant political authority in civil society. Second, law,
however it might be influenced by morals, is conceptually distinct from morals. See id.
54. See G. CHRISTIE, supranote 53, at 467. Austin himself was influenced by the views of Thomas
Hobbes, see id. at 294, and especially by Jeremy Bentham, whose definition of law as the expression of
a sovereign command foreshadowed Austin's similar definition. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON
BENTHAm 108 (1982) (noting that Austin's work was an "obviously derivative work" based on
Bentham's theory); see also W. DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLmcAL THEORIES, FROM ROUSSEAU TO
Sp N ER 211-24 (1920).
55. See G. CHRISTIE, supra note 53, at 467.
56. 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTuRES ON JUPmsPRUDENcE 90-92,99-100,225-27 (R. Campbell 4th ed. 1873)
(1832).
57. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse:ReciprocalClaims and Tolerances in Interstate
and InternationalLaw, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1115 (1956). Austinian notions of power also strongly
influenced Justice Holmes. See P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 39 (1956) ("The territorial concept was
strongly rooted in Justice Holmes's mind."); Cheatham, American Theories of ConflictofLaws: Their
Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv. 361,384 (1945) ("The opinions of [Justice Holmes] came to identify
jurisdiction with power, and legal power with physical power."); Hart, Positivismandthe Separationof
Law andMorals,71 HARv. L. REV. 593,593 (1958) (noting that Austin and Holmes shared many ideas).
For a sampling of Justice Holmes's use of these positivist concepts, see, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (the "foundation ofjurisdiction is physical power"); Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry,
228 U.S. 346, 356 (1913) ("U]urisdiction is power"); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347, 357 (1909) ("All legislation is prima facie territorial.").

407

Washington Law Review

Vol 62:397, 1987

power. 58 A law not backed by a sanction is not a law at all. 59 "In the end
[positivist theory] equates the law with power; there is law only where there
is power." 60 Austin's notion that law is ultimately based on the sovereign's
power to sanction is echoed by Justice Holmes in American Banana:
Law is a statement of the circumstances, in which the public force will be
brought to bear upon men through the courts. But [law] commonly is confined
to such prophecies or threats when addressed to persons living within the
power of the courts. A threat that depends upon the choice of the party
affected to bring himself within that power hardly would be called law in the
61
ordinary sense.
Austin's reliance on power led to notions of absolute territoriality, a
central tenet of Beale's vested rights theory. The sovereign had plenary
power to enforce its law within, but only within, its territory. 62 Thus, the
validity of acts must be determined according to the law of the sovereign in
whose territory the acts occurred. If the right is created by the law of the
sovereign, then that sovereign's law must be applied everywhere to determine the nature and extent of the right. In the words of Justice Holmes, "as
the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows
that that determines not merely the existence of the obligation. . . [,] but
63
equally determines its extent.",
It is not generally recognized that the central tenet of Austin's positivist
theory-that the sovereign's power to enforce is the ultimate source of
law-and Beale's legal expression of that tenet, combined to form the
conceptual foundations of the act of state doctrine. 64 Under Austin's
58. See I J. AUSTIN, supra note 56, at 91.
59. Id. at 101.
60. Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 89 (J. Feinberg & H.
Gross eds. 1980); see also G. CHRISTIE, supra note 53, at 294 (Austin insisted that "law is based, in the
final instance, on power or, as he termed it, 'might."').
61. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
62. See 3 J. BEALE, supra note 47, § 7, at 502 (1902) ("'[T]he law of the land' [is] a law which
belongs to a certain political subdivision of territory. The law prevails throughout this territory; and
conversely, it cannot prevail as law outside it ....
"); see also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (the general rule of construction is that a "[sitatute [is] intended to be
confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power").
63. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857 (2d Cir. 1962) ("a positivistic concept of territorial sovereignty" seems to
underlie the act of state doctrine), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
64. There is widespread uncertainty about the exact jurisprudential origin and rationale of the act of
state doctrine. See, e.g., Mathias, supra note 3, at 372 ("No writer, judge or lawyer has been able to
identify the exact origin of [the act of state doctrine]."). See also Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co.,
534 F. Supp. 896, 900 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("there remains disagreement as to the origins.., of the
doctrine"); Bazyler, supra note 3, at 334 (noting that the exact scope and meaning of the doctrine were
obscured from its inception); Gordon, The Origin and Development of the Act of State Doctrine, 8
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 595, 614 (1977) (the act of state doctrine had "mysterious beginnings"); Wallace,
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positivist theory, where the sovereign itself acts within its own territory,
where it has plenary power, its acts are, by definition, legally valid. 65 Under
66
Beale's vested rights theory, acts valid where done are valid everywhere.
Thus, acts of the sovereign, or acts of state, done within the sovereign's own
territory, by definition legally valid there, are legally valid everywhere. 67
Beale's theory was so influential that by the time the next act of state
cases were decided by the Supreme Court in 1918, it seemed as if his
"territorialist" theory had been incorporated into the United States Constitution. 68 Although the constitutional aspect of territorialism did not last
long-it soon met its demise in 1922 69-the vested rights theory and its
territorialist notions reigned supreme in the field of conflict of laws when
the Supreme Court decided Oetjen v. CentralLeather Co. 70 and Ricaud v.
American Metal Co. 71 These cases involved expropriations by the Mexican
revolutionary government of chattel property from Mexican citizens. 72 The
Mexican government then sold the property to buyers who subsequently
brought the property into the United States. 73 The original owners, who had
fled to the United States, or their successors, brought suit to recover the
IntroductoryRemarks, in AcT OF STATE AND ExTRATERRrrOIAL REACH (J. Lacey ed. 1983) (The act of
state doctrine "is in fact a fairly confused doctrine of law, not only in actual nature, but also in its
underpinnings [and] its origins."); Note, Rehabilitationand Exoneration,supra note 3, at 601-10.
While the historical roots of the doctrine are generally traced to sovereign immunity, see Libra Bank,
Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Note, Rehabilitation
and Exoneration,supra note 3, at 600-01; see also supra note 35, the act of state doctrine emerged as a
distinct and independent bar to judicial scrutiny in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), and
disagreement with respect to the original rationale for the Underhilldoctrine has existed ever since. See
Note, Limiting the Act of State, supra note 3, at 103-04 (collecting sources and noting that confusion
concerning rationale for doctrine has existed since its inception).
65. Justice Holmes echoed these thoughts in American Banana when he stated that "[t]he very
meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law." 213 U.S. at 358.
Austin's sovereign is a legally unlimited sovereign because in the area of positive law, the sovereign
could do no wrong. Austin did note that other operative forces checked the sovereign's will. See 1 J.
AusTIN, supranote 56, at 99; see also W. DUNNING, supra note 54, at 229.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
67. Cf. Mathias, supra note 3, at 392 ("The 'traditional formulation' of Underhill is indeed
traditional in that it implicitly equates 'respect' for the 'independence of every other sovereign state'
with territorial positivism (the proposition that the sovereign state can do no wrong within its own
borders).").
68. See J. MARTIN, PERSPECTVES ON CoNFLICr OF LAws: CHOICE OF LAW 1-2 (1980) (citing New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357,357-77 (1918)). New YorkLife was argued about two weeks
after the Supreme Court's next act of state decisions in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297
(1918), and Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918), and was decided one month afterthese
decisions.
69. According to Professor Martin, the constitutional aspect of territorialism met its demise in
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922). See J. MAIMN, supra note 68.
70. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
71. 246 U.S. 304(1918).
72. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 299; Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 306.
73. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 301; Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 305-06, 308.

409

Washington Law Review

Vol 62:397, 1987

goods, and the Supreme Court had to decide who had title. 74 The question
of title depended upon the resolution of Mexico's claim that it had validly
transferred title to itself when it expropriated the chattels. Applying choice
of law analysis, Ricaud held:
[T]itle to the property in this case must be determined by the result of the
action taken by the military authorities of Mexico. .

.

. [T]he act within its

own boundaries of one sovereign State cannot become the subject of reexamination and modification in the courts of another. Such action, when
shown to have been taken, becomes

this country.

75

. .

.

a rule of decision for the courts of

The current understanding of the act of state doctrine commonly links its
origins in Underhill,Ricaud, and Oetjen with the theory of comity. 76 Yet,
the theory of comity cannot wholly account for mandatory recognition of
the foreign acts of state. In Oetjen, the Supreme Court invoked the theory of
comity as an additional ground for recognizing the acts of the Mexican
government:
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be
questioned in the courts of another . . . rests at last upon the highest

considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity
of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by
the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations."77
According to Joseph Story, the chief proponent of the comity theory,
sovereign states possessed absolute and exclusive jurisdiction in their own
territories, but national laws had no effect whatsoever within the territory
of another sovereign. 78 Comity sought to reconcile the absolute territorial
74. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 299; Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 306.
75. 246 U.S. at 309-10. The same rationale accounts for the result reached in Oetjen. See 246 U.S.
at 303.
76. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 3, at 334.
77. Id. at 334 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd, 168 U.S. 250
(1897)).
78. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONFLICTOFLAWS §§ 18,20,23,25,38(2ded. 1841);see
also The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362,370 (1824) (Story, J.). As explained by the Supreme Court,
comity "is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). "[T]he principle of comity is
essentially a voluntary recognition of foreign acts based on policy considerations." Zaitzeff & Kunz,
supra note 6, at 450. The Third Circuit has explained:
Comity is. . .not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency. Although more
than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or
obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both
to international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws.
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1017 (1972); see also Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574,580,404
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sovereignty of nation states with the need for the recognition of foreign law

in appropriate cases. 79 In this respect, the comity theory was not wholly
satisfactory. The theory suffered from the conceptual difficulty that the
effectiveness of law was at once founded upon and delimited by absolute
territoriality and yet these same laws were entitled to some effect beyond
the territorial limits of the sovereign where the laws emanated. 80 Under
Story's comity theory, the laws of one nation had effect in another nation
only if the latter chose voluntarily to recognize those laws by relaxing its

absolute jurisdiction over its territory. 81 The critics of comity sought to
reconcile the concept of absolute sovereignty over territory with the notion
that in certain cases foreign laws should be recognized in domestic courts
not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of law. 82 The critics found their
solution in the vested rights theory, 83 which provided at once that law was
based upon absolute territoriality and power, but which also provided that
84
acts legally valid within one territory were equally valid in all others.
Thus, while Oetjen may have proffered comity as an additional ground
for its result, comity cannot wholly account for the mandatory recognition
force of the foreign
of the foreign acts of state. To account for the binding
85
theory.
rights
vested
the
invoke
to
had
courts
act,
The act of state doctrine thus had its origins in positivist concepts of
power and absolute territoriality as embodied in the vested rights theory of
choice of law. Ever since these early Supreme Court cases, courts 86 and
commentators 87 have associated the doctrine with power, territoriality, and'

choice of law.

N.E.2d 726, 730, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1980) ("The doctrine of comity. . . does not of its own
force compel a particular course of action. Rather, it is an expression of one State's entirely voluntary
decision to defer to the policy of another.").
79. See E. ScoLFs & P. HAY, supra note 49, at 13.
80. Id.; see also Cheatham, supra note 57, at 367-68.
81. See supra note 78; see also Cheatham, supra note 57, at 373.
82. See E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, supra note 49, at 13.
83. Id.; see also Cheatham, supra note 57, at 368.
84. See E. ScoLFs & P. HAY, supra note 49, at 13; see also supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
85. Comity was accepted as an operational theory in the courts from 1850 to 1900, but by 1918,
when Oetjen was decided, the vested rights theory was the dominant theory of conflict of laws. See E.
ScoLs & P. HAY, supra note 49, at 13.
86. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al Quywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d
1196, 1200 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
538, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
87. See, e.g., Henkin, Recollections in Tranquility, supra note 3, at 178-80; Leigh & Sandler,
Dunhill: Toward a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. L INT'L L. 685, 709-18 (1976); see also
RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (rent. Draft No. 7), supra note 17, § 469 note 1.
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Modern Theories of the Act of State Doctrine:Principlesof
Institutional Competence and FederalSupremacy

In the sixty years between the Supreme Court's first trilogy of act of state
decisions and 1964 when the Court decided the landmark case of Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,88 no significant act of state case reached
the Supreme Court. In the interim, however, two major shifts occurred in
American jurisprudence that had a profound impact upon the development
of the act of state doctrine. First, the vested rights theory had been rejected
as the dominant theory of conflict of laws. 89 Second, the Supreme Court
had established the regime of Erie Railroadv. Tompkins. 90
88. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Between 1918 and 1964, the Supreme Court intermittently referred to the
act of state doctrine, see, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1941); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1937); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937), but did not
engage in an extensive treatment of the doctrine until the events of the Cuban revolution precipitated a
series of cases involving expropriations by the Cuban government of property from United States
citizens. See infra text accompanying notes 99-152.
89. Indeed, in 1956 Professor Katzenbach noted that "the theory of 'vested rights' has been
brutally murdered." See Katzenbach, supranote 57, at 1087-88; see also Cheatham & Reese, Choice of
the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 959 (1952). The major culprits are generally acknowledged to be W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942), E. LORENZEN,
SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947), and Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law
Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933). Professor Brainerd Currie has said that Cook's attacks
"discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the
intellectual product of another." B. CURRE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (1963).
The principal objection to the vested rights theory was that it gave greater effect to foreign law than to
the local law that was the source of the courts' authority. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 49, at 14.
Cook's "local law theory" provided that instead of recognizing a foreign-created right, the forum grants
a local law remedy that approximates the result that would have obtained under the foreign law. See
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 471-88 (1924); see also
Lorenzen, Territoriality,PublicPolicy andthe Conflict ofLaws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924). For ajudicial
formulation of the "local law theory," see Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769,770 (2d Cir. 1923) (L. Hand,
J.) ("[No court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to a
jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obligation recognized by that
sovereign. A foreign sovereign under civilized law imposes an obligation of its own as nearly
homologous as possible to that arising in the place where the tort occurs. "). Cook's theory bears much
resemblance to thought current to the latter half of the twentieth century. See E. SCOLE & P. HAY, supra
note 49, at 15, 32-34.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws advocates a balancing approach under which foreign
law is applied in appropriate cases. The underlying policy of the Restatement is that courts should apply
the law of the state with the "most significant relationship" to the transaction in question. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
90. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The point that Eriehad important ramifications for
the development of the act of state doctrine was first made by Professor Henkin. See Henkin, Foreign
Affairs, supra note 3, at 809.
In ErieRailroadv. Tompkins, Tompkins was injured by a passing train of the Erie Railroad Co. near
Hughestown, Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania law, the state courts would have regarded Tompkins as
a trespasser and the railroad would not have been liable unless it was guilty of wanton or willful
misconduct. Under the "general" law, recognized by the federal courts under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), Tompkins had the status of a licensee and the railroad would be liable for ordinary
negligence. Since Tompkins was a citizen of Pennsylvania and the railroad was a New York corporation,
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Underhill, Oetjen, and Ricaud had been decided under the regime of
Swift v. Tyson, 91 which ruled that federal courts could apply federal
common law in matters involving general questions of law, and had to
follow state law only with respect to matters of local concern. 92 Under
Swift, the determination of the conflict of laws was a general question that
federal courts were free to decide. 93 By the time Sabbatino came before the
Supreme Court, the combination of Erie and Klaxon v. Stentor Electric
ManufacturingCo. 94 had established that a federal court exercising jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship 95 must apply the rules of
96
conflict of laws of the state in which the federal court sits.
Sabbatino was a diversity case, originally filed in the federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 97 As the Sabbatino litigation
unfolded, troublesome Erie issues lurked in the background. The act of
state doctrine was originally rooted in the vested rights theory of choice of
law, which was federal law under Swift v. Tyson. By the time Sabbatino
came before the Supreme Court, the Court could no longer ground the act
of state doctrine in the field of conflict of laws since to do so would posit the
act of state doctrine as an issue of state law, to be decided by the fifty states
as they wished, with binding effect upon federal courts. 98 To further
complicate matters, the original foundation of the doctrine was no longer
viable, whether viewed as a matter of state or federal law, since the vested
rights theory had been convincingly discredited. Faced with a doctrine
with no currently legitimate foundation at all, the Court needed to supply
the act of state doctrine with a valid basis in federal law.

Tompkins was able to bring a diversity action in the federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Tompkins obtained a judgment for $30,000, which the Second Circuit affirmed. See
Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
On appeal, Justice Brandeis stated that "[t]he question for decision is whether the oft-challenged
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved." 304 U.S. at 69. The Supreme Court rejected the
rule of Swift v. Tyson and "established the general principle that federal courts in diversity cases may
not, as to non-federal matters, disregard state law in matters of substantive rights." IA(2) J. MOORE, W.
TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WIcKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 0.304, at 3039 (2d ed. 1985).
91. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
92. 41 U.S. at 18-19.
93. See Dygert v. Vermont Loan & Trust Co., 94 F. 913,915 (9th Cir. 1899); IA(2) J. MOORE, W.
TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. wIcKER, supra note 90, 0.303, at 3028.
94. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). In Klaxon, the Supreme Court stated: "We are of opinion that the
prohibition declared in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. . . against such independent determinations by the
federal courts extends to the field of conflict of laws." Id. at 496. Thus, federal courts in diversity cases
must apply the conflict of laws rules of the state in which they sit. See id.

95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
96.

313 U.S. at 496.

97. 307 F.2d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
98.

See Henkin, ForeignAffairs, supra note 3, at 810.
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The facts of Sabbatino are as follows. In 1960, Farr, Whitlock & Co.
(Farr), an American commodity broker, contracted to purchase Cuban
sugar from Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (CAV), a
Cuban corporation owned principally by American nationals. 99 Farr agreed
to pay for the sugar in New York upon presentation of proper documentation. 100
In August 1960, in retaliation for President Eisenhower's restriction of
Cuban sugar imports, the Cuban government nationalized all Americanowned companies located in Cuba, including CAV. 101 On the day the
nationalization decree was issued, CAV's sugar was being loaded onto a
ship at a Cuban port. 102 Under the decree, Farr had to obtain the consent of
the Cuban government before the ship would be allowed to leave Cuban
waters. 103 To obtain this consent, Farr had to enter into contracts, identical
to those it had made with CAV, with a bank owned by the Cuban government, which in turn assigned the contracts to Banco Nacional, also a
government-owned bank. 10 4 Subsequently, Banco Nacional tendered the
bills of lading to Farr in New York for payment. 105 On the same day, Farr
received notice of CAV's claim that as rightful owner of the sugar it was
entitled to the proceeds. 106 Faced with the prospect of double liability, Farr
refused to pay Banco Nacional. 107 Rather, Farr deposited the proceeds with
Sabbatino, a court-appointed receiver of CAV's New York assets, for a
judicial determination of the proceeds' rightful owner. 108 Seeking to recover the proceeds, Banco Nacional then brought suit against Sabbatino
and Farr in the Southern District of New York. 109 The district court and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Banco Nacional's claim to the
sugar proceeds. 110
99.

376 U.S. at 401.

100.

Id.

101.

Id. at 403.

102.

Id.

103.
104.
105.

Id.at 404.
Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 405.

106.

Id.

107.

Id. at 406.

108.

Id.

109.

See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'don other

grounds, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

110. The district court ruled that the Cuban nationalization decree violated international law
because it was retaliatory, discriminatory, and confiscatory and that acts violating international law
were not protected by the act of state doctrine. See id. The Second Circuit affirmed but relied on a
different rationale. The court of appeals relied on the Bernstein exception, which removes the bar of the
act of state doctrine when the executive indicates that the doctrine should be relaxed. See infra note 133.
Based upon two letters submitted by the State Department, the Second Circuit held that the Bernstein
exception removed the bar of the act of state doctrine. See 307 F.2d at 858-59.

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
The Supreme Court reversed. " The Court turned first to the foundations
of the act of state doctrine and to the issue of whether the doctrine is
governed by federal or state law." 2 Justice Harlan rejected the notion that
the doctrine is rooted in principles of sovereign immunity and international
law. " 3 He then found a federal basis for the act of state doctrine in the
principle of separation of powers. 114 The doctrine "concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of
decisions in the area of international relations,"" 5 and embodies the
considered judgment of the "Judicial Branch that its engagement in the
task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than
further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community
of nations as a whole."116 Having built the foundation of the doctrine upon
the separation of powers principle, Justice Harlan declared that the act of
state doctrine "must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." 117
He then recast the doctrine in what is now generally recognized as its
"modem formulation" :118
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or
other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if
the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law. 119
111. 376 U.S. at 439.
112. Id. at 421-27.
113. Id. at 421. See also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F2d 1101, 1113 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985)
(Sabbatinorejected notion that act of state doctrine was based on doctrine ofsovereign immunity); Libra
Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F Supp. 870, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (events of Cuban
revolution led Supreme Court to rethink doctrine, which was originally linked with principles of sovereign immunity). Professor Henkin has suggested that perhaps Justice Harlan was too hasty in rejecting
international law as a basis of the act of state doctrine. See Henkin, ForeignAffairs, supranote 3, at 819.
114. Justice Harlan ruled that the doctrine is not required by the Constitution but has "constitutional
underpinnings" in the principle of separation ofpowers. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 423.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at425.
118. See, e.g., Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia,
729 F.2d422, 424 (6thCir. 1984);Timberlane Lumber Co. v. BankofAm. Nat'lTrust& Say. Ass'n, 549
F.2d597,605 (9thCir. 1976);Frolovav. U.S.S.R., 558FR Supp. 358,363 (N.D. II. 1983), aff'd, 761F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1985).
119. 376 U.S. at428. Sabbatino'sholdingthatthebaroftheactofstatedoctrineencompasses acts of
state in violation of international law drew intense and immediate criticism. See, e.g., Laylin, Holding
InvalidActs Contraryto InternationalLaw-A Force Toward Compliance, 1964 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROCEEDINGS 33, 36-39; McDougal, Act of State in Policy Perspective: The InternationalLaw of an
InternationalEconomy, in PRIVATE INVESTORs ABROAD-STRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS 327 (V. Cameron ed. 1966); Stevenson, The State Departmentand Sabbatino-"Ev'nVictorsAre by Victories Undone," 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707, 707-08 (1964). within eight months after Sabbatino was decided,
Congress enacted a statute adopting an international law exception to the act ofstate doctrine. The statute,
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Justice Harlan thereby accomplished the important goal of establishing a
justification of the act of state doctrine that had a valid basis in federal law.
The achievement of this goal, however, had significant ramifications in the
development and understanding of the doctrine. The classic act of state
doctrine, based upon the recognition of independent sovereignty and foreign-created rights, is a doctrine of external deference. 120 Justice Harlan's
version of the doctrine, founded on the separation of powers principle and
stressing notions of institutional competence, is a doctrine of internal
deference.121 By recasting the act of state doctrine as one of internal
deference, Sabbatino steered the development of the doctrine on a course
already charted by theories of judicial abstention and the political question
doctrine-a course subsequent decisions were eager to follow.
Sabbatino represents the last time a Supreme Court majority was able to
agree on the act of state doctrine. In its two most recent cases considering
the act of state doctrine, the Court issued fractured pronouncements on the
doctrine, spawning diverse views in the lower courts about the nature of the
doctrine.

Notwithstanding any otherprovision oflaw, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground
of the federal act ofstate doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles
of international law in a case in which a claim oftitle or other right is asserted by any party including a
foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (ortraced through) a confiscation or
other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international
law, including the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection:
Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign
state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right acquired
pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration. . . or (2) in any case
with respect to which the President determines that application ofthe act ofstate doctrine is required
in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this
effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009 (1964) (current version at
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)) (amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
The Sabbatino amendment has been narrowly construed. The applicability of the statute has been
limited to cases involving confiscated property brought into the United States. See Empresa Cubana
Exportadora de Azucary Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231,237 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S.
759 (1972)). The statute does not apply to contract claims, see, e.g., Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d
1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'don othergroundssub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 61-62,242 N.E.2d
704, 714-15, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 447-48 (1968), or to expropriations of the property of a foreign
sovereign's own nationals. See F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F Supp. 481, 489 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'dmem., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
120. See R. FALK, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 417.
121. See id.
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Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
The legal dispute in First National City Bank (Citibank) v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba,122 decided in 1972, was precipitated by the Cuban
government's expropriations of First National City Bank (Citibank)
branches in Cuba. 123 Citibank had extended a $15 million loan to a
predecessor of Banco Nacional de Cuba. 124 In retaliation for the seizure of
its branches, Citibank sold the collateral pledged to secure the loan. The
sale produced an excess of almost $2 million over and above the principal
and unpaid interest due and Banco Nacional brought suit to recover the
excess proceeds.125 Citibank, by way of setoff and counterclaim, claimed
the excess proceeds as damages for the confiscation of its Cuban

branches. 126
The district court held that the act of state doctrine did not shield the
Cuban expropriations because the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964127 explicitly removed the bar of the doctrine in
cases involving confiscations by a foreign sovereign.128 The Second Circuit
reversed, and in two separate opinions, held that the Hickenlooper Amendand that
ment did not defeat application of the act of state doctrine
29
1
Nacional.
Banco
of
favor
in
judgment
a
required
Sabbatino
In a decision that produced four separate opinions, the Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit. Justice Rehnquist, joined only by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White, found dispositive a statement from the
State Department that the act of state doctrine should not bar Citibank's
counterclaim. 130 Emphasizing the "exclusive competence of the Executive
Branch in the field of foreign affairs," 13 1Justice Rehnquist pronounced that
"the act of state doctrine justifies its existence primarily on the basis that
122.
123.

406 U.S. 759 (1972).
Id. at 760.

124.

Id.

125. Id. at 760-61.
126. Id. at 761.
127. Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009,1012-13 (1964) (currentversion at22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2) (1982)); see supra note 119.
128. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 . Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated,400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
129. The Second Circuit's first opinion reversing the district court was vacated and remanded by the
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the State Department's views on the case. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. FrstNat'l City Bank, 431 F2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
Although the State Department urged that the act of state doctrine should not be applied, the Second
Circuit decided not to alter its initial decision and reaffirmed the applicability of the doctrine to bar
Citibank's counterclaim. See Banco Nacionalde Cubav. FrstNat'l City Bank, 442F.2d530,532 (2dCir.

1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
130. First Nat'l City Bank (Citibank) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,768 (1972). The
position of the State Department was set forth in a letter from its Legal Adviser, John Stevenson. The full
text of the letter is reproduced in the appendix to the Second Circuit's decision. See Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 E2d at 536-38.
131. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 766 (footnote omitted).
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juridical review of acts of state of a foreign power could embarrass the
conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the government. " 132 Given the letter from the State Department advising the judiciary
to decide the merits of Citibank's claim, there was no possibility that
judicial action would hinder the executive's conduct of foreign affairs. In so
ruling, Justice Rehnquist declared, "[W]e of course adopt and approve the
so-called Bernstein exception," which removes the bar of the act of state
doctrine when the executive branch deems application of the doctrine
unnecessary. 133
Justice Rehnquist's endorsement of the Bernstein exception, joined only
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, was rejected by the other six
members of the Court. 134
In his dissent, Justice Brennan viewed the adoption of the Bernstein
135
exception as tantamount to an abdication of judicial responsibility.
According to Justice Brennan, nothing in Sabbatinooffered any support for
Justice Rehnquist's view that the doctrine was designed primarily to avoid
embarrassment to the political branches. 136 Rather, Justice Brennan wrote,
"Sabbatino held that the validity of a foreign act of state in certain
137
circumstances is a 'political question' not cognizable in our courts.
132. Id.at 765.
133. Id. at 768. TheBernsteinexception was established in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). In that case, Arnold Bernstein
owned all ofthe shares ofa German corporation known as the "Arnold Bernstein Line," which in turn was
the owner of a ship called the "Gandia." 163 F.2d at 247. In 1937, Bernstein was imprisoned by Nazi
officials who forced him to transfer all of his shares ofthe corporation's stock to Marius Boeger. Boeger, in
turn, transferred the shares to defendant, a Belgian corporation. Bernstein brought suit in federal district
court for damages resulting from detention of the vessel, for profits derived by defendant from use of the
vessel, and for the insurance proceeds collected by the defendant upon the wartime sinking ofthe ship. Id.
Judge Learned Hand held that "the only relevant consideration is how far our Executive has indicated
any positive intent to relax the doctrine that our courts shall not entertain actions ofthe kind at bar." Id. at
251. Finding no such indication, Judge Hand invoked the act of state doctrine and affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint.
Two years later, Judge Augustus Hand, following Learned Hand's decision, affirmed the dismissal of
Bernstein's complaint in a related case on the ground that the complaint, ifupheld, would cause the court
to examine the validity of actions by the German government. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71,75-76 (2d Cir. 1949), modified, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954).
Shortly after Augustus Hand's decision, the State Department submitted a letter stating that it was the
policy of the executive to relieve American courts from any restraint upon their power to pass upon the
validity of acts of the Nazi government. 210 F.2d at 376. Accordingly, the court modified its previous
order, "striking out all restraints based on the inability of the court to pass on acts of officials in Germany
during the period in question." Id.
134. See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 772-73 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result); id. at 773 (Powell, J.,
concurring in thejudgment); id. at 776-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Blackmun).
135. Id. at790.
136. Id. at785.
137. Id. at 787-88.

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
Drawing upon Baker v. Carr,138 Justice Brennan set forth five factors that
"point toward the existence of a 'political question. 1 39 By equating the act
of state doctrine with the political question doctrine, Justice Brennan
placed the act of state doctrine firmly within the exclusive province of the
judiciary because the "Executive Branch, however extensive its powers in
simple stipulation change a political
the area of foreign affairs, cannot by
140
claim.'
cognizable
a
into
question
The Justices once again failed to achieve a majority opinion on act of
state issues in Alfred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.14 1 This
dispute arose out of the Cuban government's confiscation of five cigar
142
manufacturing companies, all owned principally by Cuban nationals.
Following confiscation, the Cuban government appointed "interventors"
to run the cigar companies, which continued to ship cigars to American
importers, including Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. 143
The former owners of the cigar companies fled to the United States and
brought suit against Dunhill and other importers for trademark infringement and the purchase price of any cigars that had been shipped to the
importers. 144 The issue was whether the act of state doctrine was a viable
defense by the interventors who refused to reimburse the importers for
sums that the importers owed the original owners for preintervention cigar
shipments, but had mistakenly paid to the interventors. 145
The district court held that the original owners were entitled to payments
for the shipments made prior to the appointment of the interventors and that
the importers were entitled to recover from the interventors amounts
mistakenly paid for the preintervention shipments.146 The Second Circuit,
138. 369 U.S. 186(1962).
139. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 788. Justice Brennan's five factors are:
mhe absence of consensus on the applicable international rules, the unavailability of standards
from a treaty or other agreement, the existence and recognition of the Cuban Government, the
sensitivity of the issues to national concerns, and the power of the Executive alone to effect a fair
remedy for all United States citizens who have been harmed ....
Id.
140. Id. at789. Justice Douglas believed that the case was notgoverned bySabbatinobutby notions
of "[flair dealing [that] require[] allowance of the setoff to the amount of the claim on which this suit is
brought." Id. at772. Justice Powell explicitly rejected theBernsteinexception, id. at773, and stated that
"[u]nless it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with delicate foreign relations
conducted by the political branches,. .. federal courts have an obligation to hearcases such as this." Id.
at 775-76. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment because he saw no danger of judicial interference
with the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches. Id. at 776.
141. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
142. Id. at 685.

143. Id.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 684.
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527,542,546 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'din
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affirming in part and reversing in part, held that the interventors' obligation
to repay the importers had been repudiated by conduct sufficient to be
47
deemed an act of state. 1
In a five to four opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit
and held that the interventors had not satisfied their burden of proving an act
of state.148 In particular, the Court ruled that the interventors had not
sufficiently established that their actions were "the public act of those with
authority to exercise sovereign powers and was entitled to respect in our
courts."

149

Justice White's plurality opinion added yet another fertile ground of
controversy to act of state jurisprudence. In a part of the opinion that won
the support of only Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
Justice White stated, "We decline to extend the act of state doctrine to acts
committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial
50
operations. "1
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun, Justice Marshall questioned whether "the act of state doctrine can be
triggered only by a 'statute, decree, order, or resolution' of a foreign
government.' 151 Justice Marshall contended that "an act of state need not
be formalized in any particular manner [and] it need not take the form of
active, rather than passive, conduct."1 52
The cases discussed above, Underhill, Oetjen, and Ricaud, along with
Sabbatino, Citibank, and Dunhill, comprise the whole of the Supreme
partand rev'd in part sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
147. Menendezv. Saks& Co., 485 F.2d 1355,1371 (2dCir. 1973), rev'don other groundssub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
148. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 694 (1976).
149. Id. Justice White's plurality opinion stated that "[nlo statute, decree, order, or resolution of the
Cuban Government itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated its obligations in
general or any class thereof or that it had as asovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due
[Dunhill and the other] foreign importers." Id. at 695.
150. Id. at 706. Justice White's plurality opinion approving a commercial activity exception has
caused disagreement between the circuits. Compare Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d
1371, 1380--81 (5th Cir. 1980) (act ofstate doctrine does not precludejudicial resolution ofall commercial
consequences stemming from the occurrence of all public acts) andHunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,
73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977) (recognizing commercial activity exception) with MOL,
Inc. v. Peoples Republic ofBangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 83 (D. Or. 1983) (actofstate doctrine notdiluted
by commercial activity exception), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)
andCentral CartageCo. v. The Queen, 576 F. Supp. 1416, 1418 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (commercial nature of
sovereign activity not determinative on issue of whether act of state doctrine applies), aff'd without
opinion, 751 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984).
151. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 718.
152. Id. at 719-20. The dissenters disagreed with Justice White's recognition of a commercial
activity exception on the ground that "t]he carving out of broad exceptions to the doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the careful case by case approach adopted in Sabbatino." Id. at 728.
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Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
Court's guidance on the act of state doctrine. The Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncements established that the act of state doctrine is founded
primarily on judicial deference to the executive's role in the conduct of
foreign affairs. Based on their interpretation of the Supreme Court's directives, the lower federal courts quickly took the lead in developing the act of
state doctrine as a broad barrier to judicial action, transforming the doctrine
into an expansive doctrine of nonjusticiability.
C.

Development of the Act of State Doctrine in the Lower Courts

1.

The Act of State Doctrine as a Broad Doctrine of Nonjusticiability

One of the most important and often cited cases in the trend of lower
courts to use the act of state doctrine to bar judicial action is Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp.153 In response to Colonel Qadhafi's demand for a greater share of
profits and fearful of similar pressure from other oil producing nations in
the Persian Gulf area, seven major oil companies and a number of independent producers decided, during a meeting held in New York City, to present
a united front against these escalating demands. 154 Hunt, an independent
oil producer, charged the seven major oil producers with violating the
antitrust laws. 155 Hunt alleged that based on assurances from the seven oil
56
companies, he rejected Colonel Qadhafi's demands for greater profits.1
As a result of Hunt's recalcitrance, the Libyan government terminated his
57
right to produce and export oil and nationalized all of Hunt's assets. 1
According to Hunt, the seven oil companies encouraged him to resist the
Libyan demands because they knew that such refusal would lead to the
confiscation of his assets and thus eliminate him from competition. 158Hunt
charged the seven oil companies with violations of the Sherman Act and the
Wilson Tariff Act. 159
Hunt had carefully framed his pleadings to avoid naming Libya as a
defendant or in any way suggesting that Libya was a co-conspirator of the
seven oil companies. 160 Nonetheless, the district court held that this claim
was barred by the act of state doctrine because it "clearly would require
inquiry into acts and conduct of Libyan officials, Libyan affairs and Libyan
153.
154.

550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 984 (1977).
550 F.2d at 71.

155. Id.at 70.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at71-72.
Id. at72.
Id.
Id. at72n.2(citingtheShermanAct, 15U.S.C. § 1(1982), andtheMilsonTariffAct, 15 U.S.C.

§ 8 (1982)).
160.

Id.at72.
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policies with respect to plaintiff's as well as other oil producers' properties
and the underlying reasons for the Libyan government's actions. ' 16 1
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the act of state doctrine applied
because Hunt's claim would require the court to inquire into the motives of
Libya and "a judgment on the sovereign acts of Libya. . . is non-justiciable. "162 The Second Circuit thus transformed the act of state doctrine into a
doctrine of nonjusticiability and into what amounts to an automatic bar to
any claim involving any foreign sovereign governmental act. 163
Another influential and often cited decision is a 1981 decision by the
Ninth Circuit. In InternationalAssociation of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers (IAM) v. OPEC,164 IAM, a labor union, alleged that the high price
of oil and petroleum-derived products was caused by OPEC's price-setting
activities, which violated United States antitrust laws. 165 The district court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the defendants were entitled to
sovereign immunity. 166 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the basis
67
of the act of state doctrine. 1
After paying homage to Chief Justice Fuller's famous dictum in Underhill, the court stated that "[t]he act of state doctrine is similar to the political
question doctrine in domestic law. "168 The court then noted that application
of the doctrine requires a balancing of factors. 169 First, the executive branch
has the primary role in the conduct of foreign relations. 170 Second, there is a
"public interest factor" 171 in according respect to the sovereignty of foreign
161. Huntv. Mobil Oil Corp. ,410 F. Supp. 10, 24(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550F.2d68 (2dCir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
162. 550 F.2d at 73.
163. Hunt has been criticized for its expansive interpretation of the doctrine. In Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), the court stated:
Hunt has been criticized for encouraging use of the act of state doctrine as a shield by private
conspirators who are able to include some foreign governmental act in their anticompetitive
scheme. . . .Precluding all inquiry into the motivation behind or circumstances surrounding the
sovereign act would uselessly thwart legitimate American goals where adjudication would result in
no embarrassment to executive department action.
594 F.2d at 55 (footnote omitted). See also Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex Inc., 686
F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1982); Note, Sherman Act Jurisdictionand the Acts of ForeignSovereigns, 77
COLuM. L. REv. 1247 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction];Note, The Act of State
Doctrine:Antitrust Conspiraciesto Induce Foreign SovereignActs, 10 N.Y. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 495
(1978).
164. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
165. 649 F.2dat 1355.
166. 477 F. Supp. 553,569 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'don othergrounds, 649 F.2d 1354(9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
167. 649 F.2d 1354, 1361-62.
168. Id. at 1358.
169. Id. at 1359.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1360.
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states that act in a public manner. 172 Third, the availability of oil and the
world energy crisis are of grave concern to the United States and to "the
foreign policy arms of the executive and legislative branches." 173 Finally,
there is a lack of internationally accepted legal principles concerning the
legality of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. According to the court, "the
record reveals no international consensus condemning cartels, royalties, and
production agreements." 174 Given these factors, the Ninth Circuit con75
cluded that the case should be dismissed under the act of state doctrine. 1
OPEC and Huntare at the vanguard of a growing judicial trend that views
the act of state doctrine as a broad doctrine of nonjusticiability. 176 While
some courts disagree with the expansive views of OPEC and Hunt,177these
and often cited of all
two cases continue to be among the most influential
78
1
doctrine.
state
of
act
the
on
lower court opinions

172. Id.
173. id. at 1361.
174. Id. at 1361 (footnote omitted).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., DeRoburtv. GannettCo., 733F.2d701, 703 (9thCir. 1984) (actofstatedoctrinebars
judicial inquiry into motivation of foreign sovereign even where foreign sovereign itself invites such
inquiry), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 909 (1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712
F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs' bribery claim required examination of foreign sovereign's
motivation and was thus barred by act of state doctrine), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Empresa
Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981)
(mechanical application of act of state doctrine); MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F
Supp. 79,85 (D.Or. 1983) (inquiry into purpose of foreign sovereign actbarred by actofstate), aff'd, 736
F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1036 (1984); seealso Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v.
ACertain CargoofPetroleum,577 F.2d 1196,1201-05 (5thCir. 1978) (usingpoliticalquestiondoctrineto
affirm district court dismissal on basis of act of state doctrine), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
177. For an example ofjudicial disagreement with the OPECapproach, see Judge Sofaer's discussion in Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 548-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For criticism of the Hunt
decision, seeWilliamsv. Curtiss-WrightCorp., 694F.2d300, 304n.5 (3dCir. 1982);Industriallnv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,445 U.S. 903 (1980).
Other cases have, without explicitly disagreeing with OPEC or Hunt, adopted a less expansive
approach to the doctrine. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1534 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (placing burden on party asserting act of state defense to show that no exception to the
doctrine bars its application), vacatedmem., 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 304-06, 310 (2d Cir. 1981) (examining motivation and
purpose of act of foreign sovereign and finding act of state doctrine inapplicable); Rasoulzadeh v.
Associated Press, 574F. Supp. 854, 857-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (distinguishingHuntandrelyingonTexas
Trading to find act of state doctrine inapplicable), aff'd without opinion, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985).
178. See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Hunt), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 909 (1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(citing bothHuntand OPEC),cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354(1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984);
Associated ContainerTransp. (Austl.), Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1983) (same);
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 546-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing OPEC);Libra Bank, Ltd. v.
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F Supp. 870, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
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Application of the Act of State Doctrine to Cases Involving
Indefinitely Situated Property

With the rise of the international debt crisis 179 and the increase in international business transactions, courts began to apply the act of state doctrine to
sovereign acts affecting intangible property and contract rights. But, due to
the territorial nature of the doctrine, courts found difficulty in applying it to
cases involving intangible property. Under the doctrine's traditional formulation, confiscations by a foreign sovereign of property within its own
territory are protected fromjudicial inquiry by the act of state doctrine.' 80 On
the other hand, where a foreign sovereign attempts to seize tangible property
within the United States, the act of state doctrine does not apply and United
States courts are free to judge the validity of the foreign act according to
domestic law.' 81 In most cases, United States courts will not recognize
attempts by a foreign sovereign to seize property in the United States because
of the strong public policy against confiscations without compensation. 182
While locating the situs of property did not present difficulty when the cases
involved tangible property, courts became perplexed when they were required to find a situs for intangible property. 183
179. For background on the international debt crisis, see Eskridge, Les Jeux Sont Faits:Structural
Origins of the InternationalDebt Problem, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281 (1985). In 1973, the amount of
borrowing from private creditors totaled $32 billion. See WORLD BANK, DEBT AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD: CURRENT TRENDS AND PROSPEC-rS at xxiii (1984). At the end of 1983, the major Latin American
debtors alone-Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, and Colombia-owed more than
$300 billion; interest payments alone represented about 40% of all their export revenues and total debt
service equaled about 60% of earnings. See Kissinger, It's a Crisis.It Can be Solved., Washington Post,
June 24, 1984, at B8, col. I. For a concise history of the origins of Mexico's debt crisis and current efforts
at resolving these problems, see Tapia, Mexico'sDebtRestructuring:The Evolving Solution, 23 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1984).

180. In Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1027 (1966), the Second Circuit explained the territorial limitation to the act of state doctrine:
Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the principle of judicial refusal of

examination applies only to a taking by a foreign sovereign ofproperty within its own territory... ;
when property confiscated is within the United States at the time of the attempted confiscation, our
courts will give effect to acts ofstate "only if they areconsistent with the policy and law ofthe United
States."
Id. at 51 (citations omitted); see alsoZaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 6, at 450-51; Note, Rehabilitationand
Exoneration,supra note 3, at 623-31.
181. See Republic ofIraq, 353 F.2d at 51; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFICT OF LAws § 90(1971).
182. See, e.g., Menendezv. Saks& Co., 485 F.2d 1355,1364 (2d Cir. 1973),rev'donothergrounds
sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Libra Bank, Ltd. v.
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
183. The Fifth Circuit has noted this difficulty:
The situs of intangible property is about as intangible a concept as is known to the law. The situs may
be in one place for ad valorem tax purposes. . . ; it may be in anotherplace for venue purposes, i.e.,
garnishment. . .; it may be in more than one place for tax purposes in certain circumstances... ;

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
The limits of traditional act of state analysis as applied to intangible
property were quickly reached in a series of cases involving the expropriation of foreign branches of American banks. 184 In each case, a new
government had risen to power and had expropriated either the entire
branch office or a depositor's account at the branch office.185 The depositor
then sought payment of the foreign branch deposit from the main office of
the American bank in the United States. As a defense, the banks claimed
that the debts 186 were located within the foreign nations and that the foreign
sovereigns' expropriation of the debts had extinguished the banks' obligations to the depositor.
To determine the situs of the debt, the courts relied on the analysis set
forth many years before in Harris v. Balk. 187 Under Harris, a debt is
located wherever the court can obtain personal jurisdiction over the
debtor. 188 But, using this analysis, courts reached inconsistent results in
cases presenting similar circumstances. One court held that the foreign
sovereign had jurisdiction over the local branch and its expropriation of the
itmay be in still a differentplace when the need forestablishing its true situs is to determine whether
an overriding national concern, like the application of the Act of State Doctrine is involved.
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714-15 (5th Cir.) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
184. See, e.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Vishipco Line
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Perezv.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d460, 463 N.E.2d 5,474N.Y.S.2d 689, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
966(1984).
185. See Garcia,735 F.2d at 647 (seizure of account held in foreign branch); Vishipco, 660 F.2d at
857 (seizure of foreign branch office); Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 7,474 N.Y.S.2d at 691
(seizure of account deposited in foreign branch).
186. The relationship of a bank to a depositor is that of debtor and creditor and the obligation of the
bank to pay the deposit is adebt. See Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 864; 10AM. Jui. 2DBanks§ 339, at301 (1963
& Supp. 1986) (relationship between bank and its depositor is that of debtor-creditor); Comment, Debt
Situs, supra note 6, at 647 (same).
187. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). In Harris, a creditor in Maryland garnished a debt owed by a North
Carolina resident to a second creditor, also a North Carolina resident. The Supreme Court upheld the
garnishment of the debt based upon the temporary presence of the debtor in Maryland. Harriswas
substantially overruled on its facts by the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39
(1977), which held that the attachmentof the debt inHarristoobtain personaljurisdiction overthedebtor
did not meet the due process requirements of minimum contacts as set forth in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Harrisholding as to debt situs is still valid in the act of state
context. See Kuntsamnlungen zu Weimarv. Elicofon, 678 F2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982); Vishipco, 660
F.2d at 862.
188. The HarrisCourt stated:
The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him whereverhe goes. He is as
much bound to pay his debt in a foreign State when therein sued upon his obligation by his creditor, as
he was in the State where the debt was contracted. . . . This obligation can be enforced by the
courts ofthe foreign State afterpersonal service ofprocess thereinjustas well as bythe courts ofthe
domicil of the debtor.
198 U.S. at 222-23.
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branch effectively extinguished the debt owed by the branch to the depositor. 189 Another court, on almost identical facts, held that the doctrine did
not apply because the bank gave the depositor an implied promise to pay the
deposit at the home office. 190 A third case held that because the head office
had abandoned its local branch before the insurgents could seize the
physical property of the local branch, the foreign sovereign no longer had
jurisdiction over the debtor and the debt had "sprung back and clung" to
the main office. 191
In 1985, the Second Circuit further compounded the confusion surrounding the doctrine's application to intangible property in Allied Bank Internationalv. Banco CreditoAgricolade Cartago.192 Allied Bank had acted as the
agent for a syndicate of banks in the issuance of promissory notes to three
Costa Rican banks, all wholly owned by the Costa Rican government. 193 The
notes were to be repaid in New York City in installments of United States
dollars. 194 The Costa Rican banks made payments on schedule until August
1981, when, in response to an economic crisis, the Central Bank of Costa
Rica enacted restrictions on foreign currency transactions. 95 In effect, these
currency regulations imposed a moratorium on repayment by the Costa
Rican banks of the loan made by the Allied Bank syndicate. 196

189. Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460,473,463 N.E.2d 5, 11,474 N.Y.S.2d
689,695, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966(1984). Under the separateentity doctrine, a long-established rule of
banking law, a bank that accepts a deposit at one branch is not liable to return the deposit at anotherbranch.
See Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 744-45, 249 N.Y.S. 319, 320-21 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1931). Deposits madeat abranch bank arepayable there and there only, unless the branch is closed
by the main office or the depositor's demand for payment is wrongfully refused by the branch; in thatcase,
demand will lie against the main office. See id.For a history of the separate entity doctrine, see Heininger,
Liabilityof U.S. BanksforDepositsPlacedin TheirForeignBranches, 11LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903,
934-44 (1979); Logan& Kantor, Depositsat ExpropriatedForeignBranchesofU.S. Banks, 1982 U. ILL.
L. REv. 333, 340-41. The separate entity doctrine continues to be valid today. See Hoffman & Deming,
supra note 6, at 498.
190. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1984).
191. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854,862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982) (citing Heininger, supra note 189, at 975).
192. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
193. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 518.
194. Id. at 518-19.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Costa Rican decree prohibited all Costa Rican banks from repaying debt to foreign
banks in foreign currency without the approval of the Central Bank. Id. at 519. The Central Bank refused
to authorize the Costa Rican banks to pay Allied Bank. Id. In November, 1981, the President of Costa Rica
and the Minister of Finance issued a decree preventing all public entities of Costa Rica, including the
Costa Rican banks, from making any external debt repayments pending resolution of the entire Costa
Rican external debt situation. Id.
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Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
Allied Bank brought suit in the Southern District of New York to enforce
the loan agreement. In response, the Costa Rican banks asserted that the
currency decrees were acts of state, not subject97 to judicial inquiry. The
district court accepted the act of state defense.1
The Second Circuit first affirmed the district court, 198 but on rehearing,
reversed.' 99 In its opinion on rehearing, the court of appeals reasoned that
197. The district court stated:
Ajudgment in favor of Allied in this case would constitute ajudicial determination that defendants
must make payments contrary to the directives of their government. This puts the judicial branch of
the United States at odds with policies laid down by a foreign government on an issue deemed by that
government to be of central importance. Such an act by this court risks embarrassment to the
relations between the executive branch of the United States and the government of Costa Rica.
Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1444 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F2d 23 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1984)
(published in advanced sheets only), withdrawnandvacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,106
S. Ct. 30 (1985). See also supra note 4.
198. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1984)
(published in advance sheets only) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review), withdrawn and
vacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985). The Second Circuit's initial
decision caused considerable consternation among members of the international financial community.
See, e.g., Financial Times, May 24, 1984, at 36 (quoting a "leading European authority on the law
concerning international money obligations" as saying, "From now on no one in his right mind will
specify New York law and New York as a place of litigation in a loan agreement."); The Economist, May
5,1984, at 16 ("Unless and until theUnited States Supreme Courtreverses the Costa Rican ruling, bankers
will be even more cautious about their Latin American customers, who will therefore be even more
"). The Second Circuit's initial decision was withdrawn
tempted to tear up their loan agreements.
and is unpublished. See supra note 4.
199. In its initial decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, but on different grounds.
The court of appeals reasoned:
Costa Rica's prohibition of payment of its external debts is analogous to the reorganization of a
business pursuant to Chapter 11 ofourBankruptcy Code. . . .Costa Rica's prohibition ofpayment
of debt was not a repudiation of the debt but rather was merely a deferral of payments while it
attempted in good faith to renegotiate its obligations.
733 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1984) (published in advance sheets only) (copy on file with the
WashingtonLaw Review), withdrawn andvacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,106 S. Ct. 30
(1985). The court also emphasized that Costa Rica's restructuring of its debts was consistent with policies
expressed by the political and executive branches of the United States. Id. at 26-27. Finding the acts by the
Costa Rican government to be "consistent with the law and policy of the United States," the Second
Circuit upheld the Costa Rican decrees on the basis of comity. Id.
The Second Circuit based its conclusion that the Costa Rican decrees were consistent with United
States policy on actions taken by the executive with respect to Costa Rican defaults on United States
government loans. Underthe Foreign Assistance Actof 1961,22U.S.C. § 2370(q) (1982), furtheraidtoa
defaulting country is barred unless the President advises Congress that "assistance to such country is in
the national interest." Id. at 25 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2370(g) (1982)). The Second Circuit noted that
President Reagan had certified to Congress that continued United States assistance to Costa Rica is
consistent with the national interest. See id. (citing letters from George P. Schultz to Thomas P. O'Neill
datedMarch 18,1983 andOctoberl, 1983).Thecourt furthernotedthatin January 1983 theUnited States
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the applicability of the doctrine "depends upon the situs of the property at
the time of the purported taking." 200 The property at issue "is Allied's right
to receive repayment from the Costa Rican banks." 20 1 Thus, the act of state
doctrine is applicable "only if, when the decrees were promulgated, the
situs of the debts was in Costa Rica." 202 The court then held:
[T]he concept of the situs of a debt for act of state purposes differs from the
ordinary concept. It depends in large part on whether the purported taking can
be said to have "come to complete fruition within the dominion of the
[foreign] government." . . . In this case, Costa Rica could not wholly

extinguish the Costa Rican banks' obligation to timely pay United States
dollars to Allied in New York. Thus the situs of the debt was not Costa Rica. 20 3
The court noted that the same result obtained under "ordinary situs analysis. "204 Since the act of state doctrine was inapplicable, the court was free
joined several other nations in the signing of the Paris Club Agreement, which rescheduled Costa Rica's
debt to other nations, including the United States.
After Allied Bank moved for a rehearing of the Second Circuit's decision, the United States submitted
an amicus brief in support of reversal. In its brief, the Justice Department explained that the President's
certifications under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Paris Club Agreement dealt with loans by the
United States government to Costa Rica and not with commercial loans by private lenders to Costa Rica.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 11n.7, Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola De
Cartago, 757 F.2d. 516 (2d Cir. 1985). The government explained that none of these actions indicates that
Costa Rican debt to private creditors should be rendered unenforceable by virtue of actions of the Costa
Rican government to which the creditors did not agree. Id.
The government explained that with respect to private commercial loans, it supported the voluntary
debt resolution procedure already in place under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
id. at 6, which is a specialized agency of the United Nations established to promote international
monetary cooperation and stability. See infra note 445. This approach encourages the voluntary restructuring of debt between countries and private lenders within a context that presupposes that the underlying
loan contract remains enforceable. Id. By holding that such loan agreements are unenforceable, the court
risks jeopardizing this entire framework. Id. at 18. Given the court's decision, debtor countries may seek
to obtain unilateral concessions from lenders rather than negotiate real and lasting solutions to the debt
problem. Id. at 7. Creditors, on the other hand, would be less likely to continue to extend much needed
loans to debtor nations. Id. at 15-16. No one in the international financial community stands to benefit if
the IMF's voluntary debt resolution procedure is undermined. Id. at 16. Thus, Costa Rica's unilateral
suspension ofpayments undera loan agreement with private lenders is inconsistentwith United States law
and policy. Id. at 6.
After considering the government's views, the Second Circuit vacated its original opinion. See Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30
(1985).
200. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. Forthis analysis the court relied on Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard CigarCo.,
392F.2d 706,715-16(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). Forthefactsof this case, seeinfra note
290. For a critique of this approach, see infra notes 292-301 and accompanying text.
204. Without explaining what it meant by "ordinary situs analysis," the Second Circuit stated:
The Costa Rican banks conceded jurisdiction in New York and they agreed to pay the debt in New
York City in United States dollars. Allied, the designated syndicate agent, is located in the United
States, specifically in New York; some of the negotiations between the parties took place in the

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
to judge the validity of the Costa Rican decrees under United States law.
This determination, however, was limited by the traditional choice of law
rule that foreign acts "should be recognized by the courts only if they are
consistent with the law and policy of the United States. 20 5 Relying on the
Justice Department's statement of its position with respect to the Costa
Rican decrees, the court held that the decrees were inconsistent with United
States policy, refused to recognize them, and held that the loan agreements
20 6
were enforceable in the United States.
The complete fruition test adopted by the Allied Bank court was first set
forth by the Fifth Circuit. 20 7 A few months after theAlliedBank decision on
rehearing, the Fifth Circuit refused to follow its own complete fruition test

in analyzing debt situs. In Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,

208 plaintiffs

placed

certificates of deposit with Bancomer, a private Mexican bank. 209 The
certificates were denominaited in United States dollars and were payable at
Bancomer's Mexico office. 2 10 In response to its debt crisis, the Mexican
United States. The United States has an interest in maintaining New York's status as one of the
foremost commercial centers in the world. Further, New York is the international clearing centerfor
United States dollars. In addition to other international activities, United States banks lend billions
of dollars to foreign debtors each year. The United States has an interest in ensuring that creditors
entitled to payment in the United States in United States dollars under contracts subject to the
jurisdiction of United States courts may assume that, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, their rights will be determined in accordance with recognized principles of contract law.
In contrast, while Costa Rica has a legitimate concern in overseeing the debt situation of stateowned banks and in maintaining a stable economy, its interest in the contracts at issue is essentially
limited to the extent to which it can unilaterally alter the payment terms. Costa Rica's potential
jurisdiction over the debt is not sufficient to locate the debt there for the purposes of act of state
doctrine analysis ...
Thus, undereitheranalysis, ourresult is the same: thesitus of the debt was in theUnited States, not
in Costa Rica. Consequently, this was not "a taking of property within its own territory by [Costa
Rica].". . .The act of state doctrine is, therefore, inapplicable.
Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521-22 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428
(1964)).
205. Id. at522.
206. Id. The international banking community hailed the result reached by the court on rehearing,
see, e.g., Cashel, AlliedBank Casereversedonrehearing,Int'l Fin. L. Rev., Apr. 1985, at 7-8 (bankers
"will be relieved at this outcome"), but expressed concern about the clarity of the court's reasoning. See
Herzstein, The viewfrom WashingtonDC, Int'l Fin. L. Rev., Aug. 1985, at 30-31 (suggesting that while
the result reached in theAlliedBankopinion on rehearing should not be of concern, its reasoning needs to
be rethought to provide predictability to international business transactions);Lindskog, Allied Bank: The
reasoningbehindtherecentdecision,Int'l Fin. L. Rev., May 1985, at 24 (opinion on rehearing "does not
give a satisfactory analysis or explanation").
207. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 924 (1968); see infra note 290; see also Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021,
1026-27 (5th Cir.), cert.denied,409U.S. 1060 (1972) (applying and elaborating onrationaleofcomplete
fruition test).
208. 764F2d 101(5thCir. 1985).
209. Id.at 1105.
210. Id. at 1106.
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government nationalized Bancomer and imposed exchange control regulations,2 11 which required all deposits in Mexican banks, however denominated, to be paid in pesos at a rate of exchange that was well below market
rate. 2 12 Alleging heavy financial losses due to the exchange control regulations, plaintiffs brought suit against the Mexican bank for breach of
contract. 2 13 The Mexican bank asserted the act of state doctrine as a
214
defense.
Rejecting the complete fruition test, the Fifth Circuit ruled that "the
proper test for determining situs is where the incidents of the debt, as a
whole, place it. -215 According to the court, the ultimate inquiry is whether
"the ties of the debt to the foreign country [are] sufficiently close that we
216
will antagonize the foreign government by not recognizing its acts."
Examining the place where the deposit was carried, the place of payment,
and the intent of the parties regarding the governing law, the court held that
the incidents of the debt placed it in Mexico and upheld the defendant's act
217
of state defense.
The application of the doctrine to sovereign acts affecting intangible
property has added yet another area of controversy and uncertainty to act of
state jurisprudence. Courts and commentators agree that traditional act of
state analysis, which focuses on the situs of property, cannot offer guidance
in cases involving intangible property, which has an indefinite situs. They
cannot agree, however, on the proper approach to sovereign acts affecting
intangible property, and seek to apply fresh sets of specialized rules to
these novel disputes. Consequently, current act of state jurisprudence is
more crowded than ever with competing, inconsistent theories.
II.

CRITIQUE OF THEORIES OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

As discussed in Part I, shifts in the legal and jurisprudential foundations
of the act of state doctrine gave rise to the development of different theories
of the act of state doctrine. This article now examines the major theories
that comprise act of state jurisprudence and contends that no one of these
theories can justify the doctrine adequately. Moreover, the theories, taken
together, are inconsistent with each other.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1124.
Id.

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
A.

Choice of Law Theory

According to the choice of law theory, "[t]he act-of-state doctrine is, in
its origins and essence, a federal rule mandating a choice of law by which to
judge the validity of the official actions of sovereign states. 2 18 Under
traditional choice of law 219 analysis, in any case that may involve the
application of foreign law, a court must first decide whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. 220 If the court determines that it is competent
to adjudicate, it must then determine what law governs the case. 221 This
determination is made according to the choice of law rules of the forum
state. 222 If foreign law is chosen under these choice of law rules, the court
will apply the foreign law to decide the case. Under traditional choice of
law analysis, however, the court may nevertheless refuse to apply foreign
law if it is contrary to the public policy of the forum. 223 Only at this point
does the act of state doctrine become operative. "The act of state doctrine
precludes giving effect to [the] public policy [of the forum] to deny effect to
224
the foreign law."
As explained in Part I, choice of law theory accounts for the results
reached in Oetjen, 225 Ricaud,226 and Sabbatino.227 Those cases involved
the question of title to chattel property and under accepted choice of law
218. Sharonv. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538,546 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). ProfessorLouis Henkinis oneof
the chief proponents of this view. See Henkin, Recollections in Tranquility,supra note 3, at 178; see also
Leigh & Sandier, supranote 87, at 709-16. Justice White has also advocated this view. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,446 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
219. Choice of law is the body of jurisprudence that recognizes that "[tihe world is composed of
territorial states having separate and differing systems of law. Events and transactions occur, and issues
arise, that may have a significant relationship to more than one state, making necessary a special body of
rules and methods for their ordering and resolution." REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 1
(1971).
220. Jurisdiction to adjudicate refers to a state's power "to subject persons or things to the process of
its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal proceedings, and whether or not the
state is a party to the proceedings." RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELAIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supranote 15,
§ 401.
221. RESTATEmENT (SEcOmN) OF CONMICrs OF LAws § 6 (1971).
222. Id.
223. Id. § 90.
224. REsATEMENTFOREIGN RELATIONs (Tent. DraftNo. 7), supranote 17, § 469, reporters' notes l.
225. 246 U.S. 297 (1918); see supratext accompanying notes 70-75.
226. 246 U.S. 304(1918); see supratext accompanying notes 70-75.
227. 376 U.S. 398 (1964);see supratext accompanying notes 99-119. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897), can also be explained by this theory. In that case, the issue was whether General
Hernandez's detainment ofUnderhill gave rise to tort liability. Under the then prevailing conflict of laws
analysis the tortious nature ofconductwas determined by the law oftheplace where the conductoccurred.
See RFSTATEMENT (FrsT) OF CoNFUicts OF LAws §§ 377, 378 (1934). Thus, the law of Argentina
governed the issue of Hernandez's liability to Underhill. Hernandez was not liable to Underhill under
Argentinean law and the act of state doctrine mandates that no public policy of the forum can be used to
deny effect to Argentinean law.
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rules, matters of title are governed by the law of the situs of the property. 228
Thus, under choice of law analysis, title to the chattels was governed by the
law of Mexico in Oetjen and Ricaudand by the law of Cuba in Sabbatino. In
these cases, title to the chattels had been effectively transferred to the
expropriating government and the act of state doctrine mandated that no
public policy of the forum could be used to deny effect to the foreign act. 229
Under the choice of law theory of the act of state doctrine, the doctrine
adds little or nothing to ordinary choice of law analysis. 230 Indeed, the act
of state doctrine operates only under very narrow circumstances. First, a
court must choose foreign law according to the choice of law rules of the
forum state. 231 Second, the application of the foreign law must contravene
some strong public policy of the forum, e.g., a policy against expropriation
without compensation. Only at this point does the act of state doctrine
apply; the doctrine then operates to bar the forum court's use of local public
policy to deny giving effect to the foreign act. 232
The problems associated with this theory arise from the consequences of
Erie Railroadv. Tompkins.233 Act of state cases brought in federal court are
usually predicated on diversity jurisdiction, 234 or the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 235 or both. Based on either or both of these jurisdictional
predicates, federal courts must apply as their rules of decision the law of the
forum state, including the state's choice of law rules. 236
228. See infra note 238; see also infra note 237.
229. Justice White suggests as a rationale for this theory that deference to such foreign acts maintains
a certain stability in transnational transactions, avoids friction between nations, and encourages settlement of disputes through diplomatic means. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
447 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
230. One commentator has suggested that ordinary conflict of laws analysis-without any appeal to
the act of state doctrine at all-would be sufficient to resolve cases with transnational elements. See
Zander, supra note 3, at 826; see also Leigh & Sandier, supranote 87, at 716 (" [Tlhe act of state doctrine
would be more comprehensible and manageable if it were restored to its conflict of laws foundation.").
231. See, e.g., Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175,184 (2d Cir. 1971) (Feinberg, J.,
dissenting) (" [T]he act ofstate [doctrine] has no relevancy unless the New York courts would apply Cuban
law. ").
232. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 3, at 813 n.27 ("It is only when a state is tempted,
because of a local policy, to deny effect to a foreign law applicable under its rules of conflict of laws that
considerations of the foreign policy of the United States enter to require the state to give effect to the act of
the foreign state.").
233. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also supranote 90.
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
235. 28 U.S.C. 88 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611(1982).
236. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). State law governs even if
federal jurisdiction is based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 88 1330,
1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611(1982). Congress hasprovidedthat, except for the sovereign
immunity issue itself (and certain related issues), state law shall govern all cases brought under the FSIA.
Id. § 1606; see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,621 &
n. 11(1983); Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983).

Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine
So long as act of state cases involved completed or attempted confiscations of tangible property, there was no real likelihood that courts of
different states would reach different results in applying local choice of law
rules. The choice of law rule that the law of the situs governs issues of title
238
237
to the res is a universal rule accepted in the United States and abroad.
Thus, universal acceptance of the lex situs rule promised uniform results.
Since Sabbatino, however, the act of state doctrine has been involved
increasingly in a variety of contexts and the application of the forum state's
choice of law rules could lead to diverse results. For example, in both PanAmerican Life Insurance Co. v. Blanco2 39 and Johansen v. Confederation
Life Association,240 federal courts had to decide whether the act of state
doctrine was implicated in determining the effect to be given Cuban currency
regulations that purported to alterrights under insurance contracts issued by
insurance companies doing business in Cuba. 24 1 The contracts were issued
to Cuban residents who subsequently fled to the United States to avoid the
consequences of the Cuban revolution. 242 Both courts first recognized that in
diversity cases, a federal court must apply the choice of law rules of the state

in which it sits. 243 In Pan-AmericanLife, the Fifth Circuit applied Louisiana
choice of law rules, which, at the time, specified that the law of the place of
performance governed matters of performance under the contract. 244 Find237. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 115, 116 (1812) (Story, J.) ("The court
entertain no doubt. . . that the title to land can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by the
law of the place where such land is situate."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 223, 226
(1971); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICTOF LAWS §§ 214-254 (1934). See generallyR. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977):
The original creation of a first title in previously unowned land, the validity and effect of subsequent
transfers whether voluntary or involuntary, the creation of incumbrances upon or subsidiary interests in the land, the legal effectupon the title of such events as marriage, death, infancy, orinsanity of
an owner, and the measure of control over the land inherent in any form of ownership, all have
traditionally been said to depend upon the land law of the place where the land lies.
Id. at 341.
238. A leading commentator observes:
It is at present the universal principle, manifested in abundant decisions and recognized by all
writers, that the creation, modification, and termination of rights in individual tangible physical
things are determined by the law of the place where the thing is physically situated.
4 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 30 (1958) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., A.
EHRENSWEIG, A TREATISE ON CONFICT OF LAWS 607-33 (1962); 2 J.H.C. MORRIS, L. COLLINS, J.
MCCLEAN & M. MANN, DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 548 (10th ed. 1980); E. RE, FOREIGN
CONFISCATIONS INANGLO-AMERICAN LAW-A STUDY OFTHE "RULE OFDECISION" PRINCIPLE 159 (195 1);

Baade, IndonesianNationalizationMeasures Before Foreign Courts-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 801,
801 (1960).
239. 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966).
240. 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971).
241. Johansen,447 F.2d at 180; Pan-AmericanLife, 362 F.2d at 168-70.
242. Johansen,447 F.2d at 177-78; Pan-AmericanLife, 362 F.2d at 168-70.
243. Pan-AmericanLife, 362 F.2d at 170; Johansen,447 F.2d at 178.
244. See, e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 319 n.5 (5th Cir. 1959)
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ing the place of performance to be the United States since the contracts were
payable there, the Fifth Circuit held that the Cuban currency laws did not
apply to the insurance contracts. 245 In Johansen, the Second Circuit applied
New York choice of law rules, which advocate a "grouping of contacts"
approach 246 or an "interest-based approach. ' 247 As a result, the Second
Circuit found that the insurance contracts were governed by Cuban law.248
In Pan-AmericanLife and Johansen, both federal courts faced the issue of
the effect to be given the currency decree of a foreign sovereign. In a matter
that seems to implicate United States foreign policy and international law,
the federal courts applied discrete bodies of state law to decide the case. 249
Moreover, if the state law had been unclear, the federal courts might have
guessed-subject to being mistaken and overruled by the state courts. 250
The problem, then, with the choice of law theory is that the federal act of
state doctrine becomes applicable only after a court has decided, under
state choice of law rules, that the foreign law applies. 251 Since each state
(applying Louisiana law); Bologna Bros. v. Morrissey, 154 So. 2d 455, 459 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
245 La. 56, 156 So. 2d 601 (1963). Article 10 of the Louisiana Civil Code, in effect at the time that PanAmerican Life was decided, provides in pertinent part:
The form and effect of public and private written instruments are governed by the laws and usages of
the places where they are passed or executed. But the effects of acts passed in one country to have
effect in another country, are regulated by the laws of the country where such acts are to have effect
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 10 (West Supp. 1986); see also Comment, Conflict of Laws in Louisiana:
Contract, 38 TUL. L. REv. 726,729 (1964) ("As embodied in article 10 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the
rule lex loci solutionis is unquestionably the proper principle to be applied by the Louisiana courts.").
245. Pan-AmericanLife, 362 F.2d at 170-71; see also supra note 244.
246. Johansen, 447 F.2d at 178 (citing Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101
(1954)).
247. Id. (citingMillerv. Miller, 22N.Y.2d 12, 15-16,237N.E.2d877,880,290N.Y.S.2d734, 737
(1968)).
248. Id. at 179-80.
249. A more recent example of a federal court applying state choice of law rules to determine the
effect of foreign currency decrees is Irving Trust Co. v. Mamidakis, No. 78-0265 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
1978), where the court ruled that under New York law, currency regulations issued by the Greek
government did not apply to loan agreements payable in New York.
250. See supra note 94.
251. The proponent of the choice of law theory of the act of state doctrine may argue that one way to
meet this objection is to make an exception to Erieand apply a federal common law choice of law doctrine
when the choice of law question involves the law of a foreign sovereign. Cf Jessup, The Doctrineof Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to InternationalLaw, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740,743 (1939) ("whatever the
specific grounds for disposing of an individual case, any attempt to extend the doctrine of the Tompkins
case to international law should be repudiated").
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Justice Brandeis wrote: "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Act of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the State. . . .There is no federal general common law." Id. at 78. It is now generally recognized that
this statement is not entirely true and that federal courts can fashion "specialized" federal common law,
substantive rules of law not expressly authorized by either the Constitution or any act of Congress, that
preempt state law. See Friendly, In Praise ofErie-And ofthe New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
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has its own choice of law jurisprudence, the critical issue of governing law
could be decided as they wish by the fifty states. As Judge Friendly stated:
It is fundamental to our constitutional scheme that in dealing with other
nations the country must speak with a united voice. . . .It would be baffling
if a foreign act of state .. .were ignored on one side of the Hudson but

respected on the other; any such diversity between states would needlessly
complicate the handling of the foreign relations of the United States. The
required uniformity can be secured only by recognizing. . . that all questions relating to an act of state are questions of federal law, to be determined
252
ultimately, if need be, by the Supreme Court of the United States.
When choice of law determinations involve the effect to be given foreign
sovereign acts, they implicate the foreign relations of the United States and,
in the words of Professor Henkin, matters concerning "the nation's foreign
relations are 'intrinsically federal. '"253
B.

Theory of JudicialDeference to the Executive's Role in the Conduct
of ForeignAffairs

According to the theory ofjudicial deference to the executive, "the act of
state doctrine justifies its existence primarily on the basis that juridical
review of acts of state of a foreign power could embarrass the conduct of
foreign relations by the political branches of the government. ' 254 The
REv. 383,405 (1964); see also C. WiuoiGH, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60, at 388 (1983). One area where
federal common law, not state law, should govern are cases involving a strong national orfederal concern,
such as foreign relations. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &E. COOPER, FEDERALPRACrCEAND PROCEDURE
§ 4514, at 224-25 (1982); Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv.
1555,1 559-61 (1982). Thus, itispossibleto arguethattheEriedoctrineshouldnotbeappliedt choiceof
law questions involving the law of a foreign sovereign and that this issue should be governed by a federal
common law choice of law doctrine.
The new conception of the act of state doctrine suggested by this article-that the act of state doctrine
should be analyzed in terms ofjurisdiction to prescribe-is, in essence, a federal choice of law approach
to act of state cases. See infra text accompanying notes 337-42, 371-73. Whether an approach based on
the doctrine ofjurisdiction to prescribe is preferable to or really differs from an approach based on the
development of a federal common law choice of law analysis is a topic that is beyond the scope of this
article.
252. Republic of Iraq v. FirstNat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1027 (1966).
253. Henkin, ForeignAffairs, supra note 3, at 815. Professor Henkin elaborates:
When a law of a foreign country is concerned, the choice of law rules hardly are a matterofprimarily
local policy and concern; they impinge on national interests and the foreign relations of the United
States. International conflicts, then, may raise federal questions on which states do not call the tune
but must follow the federal lead.
Id. at 820 n.51.
254. FirstNat'l CityBankv. Banco Nacionalde Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,765 (197 1) (plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, J.).
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predicate of this theory is that the executive branch has "exclusive compe255
tence . . . in the field of foreign affairs."
Under the separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary must operate
independently and free of influence and direction from the executive or
legislative branches. 256 The judicial deference theory of the act of state
doctrine may lead to violations of the separation of powers doctrine because
the judiciary becomes unduly influenced by the executive in act of state
cases.
Under the judicial deference theory, courts should abstain from deciding
cases involving acts of a foreign sovereign because a judicial decision at
odds with executive foreign policy could embarass the executive in its
conduct of foreign affairs. 257 If the court is uncertain whether a decision
would be inconsistent with United States foreign policy, then the court
should abstain to avoid risking embarassment to the executive.2 58 On the
other hand, where the executive has stated that a judicial decision will not
interfere with foreign policy, then, under the judicial deference theory,
courts should decide the case since the reason for abstention, i.e., possible
embarassment to the executive, has been removed. 259 If courts obediently
followed executive positions on whether judicial power should be exercised
in act of state cases, then the executive becomes the decisionmaker and, in
effect, usurps the judicial power from the courts. The judiciary is reduced
to a "mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick
some people's chestnuts from the fire and not others. ,,260
Even if judicial compliance does not always rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, heavy reliance on the views of the executive
tarnishes the image of the judiciary as an independent branch of government. For example, in the Second Circuit's first Allied Bank decision, the
Costa Rican defendants submitted evidence of continuing United States
governmental aid to Costa Rica despite its defaults on loans from the United
States government. 261 Taking this to be an indication of executive approval
of Costa Rica's suspension of all debt, the Second Circuit recognized the
Costa Rican currency decrees as legal justification for the Costa Rican
255.
256.

Id. at 766 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1975) (per curiam); see generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-2 to 2-4 (1978).
257. See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 765-67.
258. See, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F Supp. 1440, 1444
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (published in advance sheets only), withdrawn and
vacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).

259.

SeeFirst Nat'l Bank v. BancoNacional deCuba, 406 U.S. 759,768(1972) (pluralityopinion of

Rehnquist, J.).

260.

First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional deCuba, 406 U.S. 759,773 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring

in the result).
261. See supra note 199.
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banks' failure to repay private debt. 262 On rehearing, the Justice Department contended that the Costa Rican private debt moratorium was inconsistent with United States policy. The court then reversed its position on the
decrees, stating that "[i]n light of the government's elucidation of its
position, we believe that our earlier interpretation of United States policy
was wrong." 263 Apparently, the Justice Department's views played a critical, if not dispositive, role in the Second Circuit's decisions. Such an
abrupt turnaround by the court blemishes its reputation as an independent
and impartial branch of government.
Judicial reliance on executive positions with respect to issues having
foreign policy implications politicizes judicial decisionmaking. The executive branch is motivated by political objectives that change as various
political administrations in the United States come into power. As a result,
executive pronouncements on the act of state doctrine264have been inconsistent, impeding judicial development of the doctrine.
Finally, the injection of the demands of political expediency into judicial
decisionmaking undermines one of the classic justifications of judicial
review in a democratic society-that the judicial branch, because of its
insulation from the practical needs and pressures of the "moment's hue and
cry,' 265 has the unique institutional capacity to provide the "sober second
267
thought" 266 that helps shape and protect our society's enduring values.
C.

Theory of NonjusticiabilityBased on the Political Question
Doctrine

According to Justice Brennan, "Sabbatino held that the validity of a
foreign act of state in certain circumstances is a 'political question' not
cognizable in our courts. 268 However, while the SabbatinoCourt may have
perceived some similarity between the act of state doctrine and the political
question doctrine, the Court did not equate the two doctrines. As Professor
McDougal states:
262. See id.
263. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d at 519-20.
264. See Bazyler, supranote 3, at 362-65. Indeed, Professor Bazyler states that:
As a result of its inconsistent pronouncements, the Executive has been a major culprit in creating
judicial confusion about the actof state doctrine. Without the Executive's involvement, thejudiciary
mightbynow have formulated aworkable and consistent doctrineforinternational transaction cases.

Id. at 365.
265. A. BiCK.L, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (1962).
266. Id. (quoting Stone, The Common Law in the UnitedStates, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936)).
267. A. BiCKEL, supra note 265, at 25.
268. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,787-88 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 E2d 1354,
1358 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The act of state doctrine is similar to the political question doctrine in domestic
law."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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The policies applied by the [Sabbatino] Court, relating to the appropriate
allocation of competences among the different branches of our Government,
are, in fact, those which underlie the "political questions" doctrine, but the
Court did not apply the tests for "political questions" which it had so recently
announced in Baker v. Carr. . . . and it did not find the issue nonjusticiable, as application of the "political questions" doctrine would have required.
The doctrine of automatic, blanket abstention announced by the Court is
269
clearly a new, and bizarre creation.

Moreover, Justice Brennan did not explain why, if the act of state and
political question doctrines were equivalent, act of state issues cannot
simply be subsumed under the political question analysis. 270 In other
words, Justice Brennan did not explain the need for a separate act of state
doctrine at all.
Lower courts have relied on the political question theory as the basis for
an expanded version of the act of state doctrine that requires judicial
abstention. 27 1 The danger of this approach is that even when traditional act
of state rules do not barjudicial inquiry, courts rely on vague and undefined
notions of nonjusticiability as a vehicle for judicial abstention. 272 It is one
thing for courts to apply the true political question analysis of Baker v.
Carr;273 it is another for courts to invoke a general notion of nonjusticiability to avoid deciding a case simply because it involves an international transaction and difficult issues. This broadened theory of the act of
state doctrine leads courts to neglect their duty to adjudicate and denies
274
litigants access to the courts.
269. The ForeignAssistanceAct of1965: Hearingson H. 7750Before the HouseComm. on Foreign
Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1037 (1965).
270. See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 390.
271. See supra note 176.
272. An example ofthis trend is Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer, 3 W.L.R. 787 (1981). Finding that
traditional act ofstate analysis did not barjudicial review, Lord Wilberforce asked whether "there exists in
English law a more general principle that the courts will not adjudicate upon the transactions of foreign
sovereign states." Id. at 804. He found that such a principle existed. This principle, however, is not a
particular version of the act of state doctrine, but a general "principle, in suitable cases, of judicial
restraint or abstentions." Id. at 804, 806.
273. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
274. In Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court stated:
Our national policy reflects, if anything, a reexamination of Sabbatino, rather than a political
consensus for its transformation into a jurisdictional bar through its amalgamation with the analogous but similarly questionable device ofjudicial abstention. Absent some guidance to the contrary
from the political branches, the present circumstances do not justify a refusal to perform the duty to
adjudicate.
Id. at 553.
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D.

Theories Underlying the IntangibleProperty Cases

The intangible property cases, which involve sovereign acts affecting
debt obligations, rely on three different theories to analyze debt situs. First,
courts use the debt situs analysis of Harrisv. Balk,275 which focuses on
personal jurisdiction over the debtor. Other courts adopt the complete
fruition test, 276 which focuses on the foreign sovereign's physical power
over the property. Finally, the emerging incidents of the debt 277 theory
considers whether judicial inquiry will frustrate the foreign sovereign's
reasonable expectations of dominion over the debt.

1.

The Harris v. Balk Analysis

In Harris,the Supreme Court stated that "It]he obligation of the debtor
to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes." ' 278 In
Menendez v. Saks & Co., 279 the lower court Dunhillopinion, 280 the Second
Circuit applied the Harristest in an act of state case involving conflicting
claims to debts owed by an American cigar importer. 281The Second Circuit
found the United States to be the situs of the importer's obligation to pay the
former owners of the cigar companies for a portion of the debts. 282 The
court stated that "[f]or the purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not
'located' within a foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or
collect it. . . . [T]he power to enforce payment of a debt. . . generally
283
depends on jurisdiction over the person of the debtor.

275. 198 U.S. 215 (1904); see supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 200-03.
277. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco
Nacional de CostaRica, 570F. Supp. 870,881 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Foran argument in favorof this view, see
Note, Resolving Debt Situs, supra note 6. See also Hoffman & Deming, supra note 6 (courts should
enforce expectations of all parties to a financial transaction).
278. 198 U.S. at 222.
279. 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub. nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The Supreme Court, however, did not disturb the Second Circuit's debt situs

analysis.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See supra text accompanying notes 141-52.
Menendez, 485 F.2dat 1360-61.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1364, 1365 (citing Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1904)).
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As a practical matter, the rigid Harrisformula presents problems. 284
Since the Harristest relies on the single factor of personal jurisdiction to
situate the debt, a debt can have multiple situses because more than one
state or nation can have personal jurisdiction over the debtor. The possibility of multiple situses of debts did not cause problems in the first act of
state cases applying the Harris test because in those cases the foreign
government was attempting to collect debts, typically in the form of
accounts receivable, from American debtors. 285 Since the foreign nation
did not have personal jurisdiction over the American debtors, the debts
were not located in the foreign nation. On the other hand, in the loan default
cases such as Allied Bank,286 the foreign sovereign is the debtor and is
attempting to avoid payment of the debt to American creditors. A mechanical application of the Menendez/Harrisrules will always locate the debt in
the foreign nation since the foreign nation, in theory, always has the power
to enforce the collection of the debt from one of its citizens or instrumentalities. 2 87 The Menendez/Harris test thus broke down in the loan default
cases, causing the courts to engage in an uncertain search for a new
approach.288

284. The revised Restatement of Foreign Relations has criticized this mechanical approach:
In principle, it might be preferable to approach the question of the applicability of the act of state
doctrine to intangible assets not by searching for an imaginary situs forproperty that has no real situs,
but by determining how the act of the foreign state in the particular circumstances fits within the
reasons for the act of state doctrine and for the territorial limitation ....
RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7), supra note 17, § 469, reporters' notes 4; see also
Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible:A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 102, 123
(1978) (mechanical situs rules do not take into account "the competing values-deference to foreign
states, uncertainty about governing legal principles, and protection of property rights").
285. See, e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Menendez v.
Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'dinpartandrev'dinpart,Menendezv.
Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'dsub. nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 192-217.
287. See Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 E2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp870, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Note, ResolvingDebtSitus,supranote 6,
at 600-01. The Harristest could also lead to a priority of confiscation problem in the bank deposit cases.
Application ofthe Harrisrule will "expose deposits made in an American bank, payable in United States
currency at any of its branches worldwide, to confiscation by any country in which the bank maintains a
branch office." Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 478, 463 N.E.2d 5, 13, 474
N.Y.S.2d 689,697 (1984) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Although a debt may have multiple situses, it is buta
single obligation and once it is collected, it is extinguished. See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
735 F.2d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 1984). Thus, the sovereign that first acts to confiscate, extinguishes the debt.
See Comment, Debt Situs, supra note 6, at 668.
288. For a further critique of the Harristest, see infra text accompanying notes 428-30.
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2.

The Complete FruitionTest

The complete fruition test places the debt within the territory of the
foreign sovereign if "the purported taking can be said to have 'come to
complete fruition within the dominion of the [foreign] government.'"289
This analysis was established by the Fifth Circuit in TabacaleraSeveriano
Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co.:290
[W]hen a foreign government performs an act which is an accomplished fact,
that is when it has the parties and the res before it and acts in such a manner as
to change the relationship of the parties touching the res, it would be an
affront to such foreign government for courts of the United States to hold that
such an act was a nullity. Furthermore, it is plain that the decisions took into
there was nothing the United
consideration the realization that in most cases
29
States courts could do about it in any event. '
292
This view of the act of state doctrine is hailed as "a common-sense one"
because it recognizes that when the taking has already been completed,
United States courts are powerless to alter the result.293 The complete fruition test has also been called the "power theory" 294 because it emphasizes the
physical power of the foreign sovereign to achieve the confiscation and the
inability of United States courts to undo what already has been done.
One flaw with this view is that it is often not true that United States courts
are powerless to undo the foreign act of confiscation. In fact, the legal
dispute is often triggered by the entry of the disputed property into the
United States where the original owner or a successor in interest seeks its
return. 295 In addition, many foreign nations now have assets in the United
States that are exposed to judicial execution and that can be used to offset
296
losses sustained by victims of confiscation.
289. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,521 (2d Cir.) (quoting
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 924 (1968)), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
290. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). Tabacalerainvolved claims by the
plaintiff sole stockholder of a Cuban corporation for the purchase price of tobacco sold to the defendant
American corporation. 392 R2d at 707. A few months after the sale, Cuba "intervened" plaintiff's
business. Id. The Fifth Circuit upheld plaintiff's claim on the ground that because Cuba did not have
control over the property in question, the act of state doctrine did not apply. Id. at 714-16.
291. 392E2dat715.
292. Id.;seealsoAlliedBanklnt'lv.BancoCredito Agricolatde Cartago,757F.2d516,521(2dCir.)
(actofstateanalysis "mustalways be temperedby common sense"), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
293. See Tabacalera,392 E2d at 715.
294. See Note, Rehabilitationand Exoneration,supra note 3, at 628.
295. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,301 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal
Co., 246 U.S. 304, 306 (1918).
296. Forexample, in Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de CostaRica, 570 R Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), Costa Rica, which had defaulted on commercial loan contracts with American banks, had considerable assets in the United States at the time ofthe default, including $800,000 in various New York City
bank accounts. See id. at 882.
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The basic flaw with the power theory, however, is that "[t]o relate law to
physical power over persons and property within territorial limits is. . . to
employ a misleading point of departure." 297 It is a truism that the ultimate
effectiveness of law depends upon power to coerce compliance, so the
relationship of law to physical power cannot be ignored. 298 The power
theory, however, elevates the element of physical power to the sole criterion
for determining when acts by foreign sovereigns must be respected. But the
possession alone of physical power says nothing about whether the exercise
of that power is proper or wise or whether respecting such power promotes
or defeats the goals of the international legal order. 299 Moreover, there is
something deeply disturbing about a legal doctrine that legalizes the use of
naked power and promotes to a sovereign prerogative the expropriating
nation's expectation that its use of force will be respected everywhere. We
seem to believe that there is a distinction between law and naked power and
that what legitimates sovereign authority is more than just the power to
enforce the sovereign's will. 300 The power theory of the act of state doctrine
fails entirely to take these attitudes into account but simply legalizes the
primitive "attitude that a nation will take what it can, when it can." 30 1
3.

The Incidents of the Debt Analysis

The virtue of the incidents of the debt analysis is that it explicitly rejects a
mechanical approach that focuses on a single determinative factor such as
personal jurisdiction. Rather, in such cases the act of state doctrine bars
courts from invalidating a foreign act only when to do so would frustrate the
foreign sovereign's "reasonable expectations of dominion" over the property in question. 30 2 The incidents of the debt analysis examines a variety of
297.
M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 175
(1961).
298. See id.
299. See id.; see also id. at 180 ("Where a sovereign possesses the means to enforce its [law], its
jurisdiction is unlikely to be questioned elsewhere. But the fact of physical power does not legitimize the
exercise of such power ..
").
300. In discussing Austin's view that power is the ultimate source of law, see supra text accompanying notes 58-60, Professor Dworkin writes:
We make an important distinction between law and even the general orders of a gangster. We feel that
the law's strictures-and its sanctions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the
outlaw's commands are not. . . .Perhaps the distinction we make is illusory-perhaps our feelings of some special authority attaching to the law is based on religious hangover or another sort of
mass deception. But Austin does not demonstrate this, and we are entitled to insist that an analysis of
our concept of law either acknowledge or explain our attitudes, or show why they are mistaken.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 19 (1978); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88
(1961) (criticizing Austin's theory as viewing sovereign as a "gunman writ large").
301. Henkin, Recollections in Tranquility,supranote 3, at 189.
302. Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) is the first case to advocate an incidents of the debt analysis.
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factors in order to determine whether "the ties of the debt to the foreign
country [are] sufficiently close that [United States courts] will antagonize
the foreign government by not recognizing its acts." 30 3 Factors to be
of
weighed in this analysis include jurisdiction over the debtor, the place
30 4
payment, intent as to governing law, and currency denomination.
Insofar as courts are attempting to determine the circumstances under
which an act of a foreign sovereign should be recognized as binding on
United States courts, the incidents of the debt approach serves the same
fundamental function as a choice of law approach. 30 5 However, the incidents of the debt analysis focuses exclusively on the expectations of the
foreign nation and ignores other legitimate interests that are weighed in a
choice of law approach, such as the needs of the international system, the
protection of justified expectations (including those of the forum state and
field of law, and
private parties), the basic policies underlying the particular
30 6
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result.
E. Confusing Exceptions and Limitations
The existence of numerous exceptions and limitations to the act of state
doctrine is further indication of the inadequacy of current act of state
theories. 30 7 Judicial dissatisfaction with the harsh results often reached
under the act of state doctrine has led courts to create numerous exceptions
and limitations to temper its application. Unfortunately, the confusion that
has plagued the doctrine itself also infects its exceptions and limitations.
The TerritorialLimitation

1.

The territorial limitation to the act of state doctrine can be traced to
Underhill'sstatement of the doctrine. 30 8 Under this limitation, the act of
state doctrine does not apply when the foreign sovereign attempts to
confiscate property located in the United States. 30 9 Rather, only takings by
303. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1124(5th Cir. 1985).
304. See Note, Resolving Debt Situs, supranote 6, at 611-13.
305. Seeid. at611 n. 106(notingthesimilaritybetweentheincidents ofthedebtanalysisandchoiceof
law rules).
306. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CoNFLIcr OP LAws § 6 (1971).
307. For a comprehensive discussion ofthe exceptions and limitations to the act of state doctrine, see
Comment, TheActofStateDoctrine:AHistoryofJudicialLimitationsandExceptions, 18 HAitv. J. INT'L

L. 677 (1977).
308.

See Underhill v. Herandez, 168 U.S. 250,252 (1897); see also supratext accompanying note

44.
309. See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47,51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1027 (1966); see also supranote 180 and text accompanying note 182.
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the foreign sovereign done within its own territory are protected from
judicial scrutiny. 310 As suggested earlier, the territorial nature of the
doctrine can be traced to positivist and vested rights theory. 31' Only
commands backed by the sovereign's power are laws; since the sovereign
has plenary power within, but only within, its territory, commands that are
extraterritorial in reach, and thus not backed by sovereign power, are not
entitled to recognition as a matter of law by the forum sovereign. 312
While the forum may voluntarily choose to recognize the foreign sovereign's extraterritorial law as a matter of comity, 3 13 a United States court is
never obliged to recognize an extraterritorial foreign law that is prejudicial
to the interests of its citizens or inconsistent with United States public
policy. 314 A foreign sovereign's attempted confiscation of property located
within the United States, an extraterritorial act that will be recognized, if at
all, only as a matter of comity, generally will not be recognized because the
attempted confiscation is inconsistent with United States public policy.
While there is no dispute about the vitality of the territorial limitation to
the act of state doctrine, the limitation is a source of problems for the
courts. Although Sabbatino shifted the justification of the act of state
doctrine from positivist concepts of power and absolute territoriality to
concerns of institutional competence, the Supreme Court retained the
doctrine's territorial limitation, which is rooted in the same positivist
foundations the Court already had rejected. 315 When the doctrine was one
of external deference, rooted in notions of sovereign power and territoriality, it made sense to apply the doctrine only when the acts occurred
within the sovereign's territory. The modem doctrine is one of internal
deference based upon judicial deference to the executive's primary role in
the conduct of foreign affairs. Given this rationale, there is no apparent
reason to distinguish between foreign sovereign acts that occur entirely
within the sovereign's territory and those acts that also attempt to affect
interests in the United States. 316 In both cases, judicial action may interfere
with the executive's conduct of United States foreign affairs. Yet, under the
territorial limitation, the doctrine does not apply at all when the foreign
sovereign attempts to take property located in the United States. The
310. See supra note 180.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 47-67.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
313. See supra note 78.
314. See, e.g., LakerAirways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d909, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1984);Tahan v. Hodgson,
662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976);
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
316. See Henkin, ForeignAffairs, supra note 3, at 828.
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modem formulation of the doctrine, then, has resulted in the uneasy fusion
of the territorial limitation-the doctrine's principal qualification when it
was a doctrine of external deference-with the doctrine's modem rationale,
which is one of internal deference.
2.

The Bernstein Exception

As discussed in Part I, the Bernstein exception relaxes the bar of the act
of state doctrine when the executive indicates that judicial action will not
embarrass its conduct of foreign affairs. 3 17 However, given the apparent
disapproval of this exception by a majority of the Supreme Court in
Citibank,318 it is unclear whether the Bernstein exception is still viable.
3.

The CommercialActivity Exception

As with the Bernstein exception, similar uncertainty surrounds the
commercial activity exception. In Dunhill, Justice White's plurality opinion stated that the doctrine should not protect sovereign acts done in the
course of purely commercial activities. 319 The other members of the
Supreme Court, however, could not agree on whether to recognize this
320
exception. Lower courts reflect this disagreement.
4.

The Treaty Exception

Sabbatino's statement of the act of state doctrine expressly excepted
from its scope issues governed by a "treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles." 321 The Court of Appeals for
322
the Sixth Circuit recently recognized this exception.
5. The Human Rights Exception
The seventh tentative draft of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States (Revised) explains this exception:
317. See supranote 133.
318. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,772 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in the result);id. at777-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting,joined byJustices Stewart, Marshall, and
Blackmun).
319. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,706 (1976) (plurality

opinion of White, J).
320. See supra note 150.
321. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964).
322. See Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729
F.2d 422,427-28(6th Cir. 1984) (treaty between United States and Ethiopia precluded application ofact
ofstate doctrine to barAmerican company's claim fordamages sustained as result of Ethiopian expropriation of its holdings in Ethiopia).
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A claim arising out of an alleged violation of fundamental human rights-for
instance, a claim on behalf of a victim of torture or genocide-would (if
otherwise sustainable) probably not be defeated by the act of state defense,
since the accepted international law of human rights is both well established
323
and contemplates external scrutiny of such acts.
As yet, this exception has not been recognized explicitly by the courts.
The creation of these exceptions and limitations to the act of state
doctrine signals a chronic judicial dissatisfaction with the doctrine. Rather
than curing the doctrine's flaws, however, the exceptions and limitations to
the doctrine only contribute to the growing judicial confusion and disagreement that marks current act of state jurisprudence.
F. Inadequacy and Inconsistency of CurrentAct of State Theories
None of the major theories of the act of state doctrine alone provides a
satisfactory explanation or account of the doctrine. Moreover, the theories,
taken together, cannot be used cumulatively to justify the doctrine because
they are inconsistent with each other. The choice of law and the debt situs
theories are theories of external deference that focus on the circumstances
under which United States courts should recognize foreign acts of state as
binding law. The theory ofjudicial deference to the executive in the conduct
of foreign affairs and the political question theory are theories of internal
deference. They focus primarily on issues of institutional competence and
the limitations on the role the judicial branch can play in the conduct of
foreign affairs, a task reserved primarily for the executive branch.
It is evident that these two theoretical camps will lead often to inconsistent results. Whether to apply foreign law based on notions of territoriality,
power, or choice of law factors may have nothing to do with whether
judicial action will conflict with particular goals of foreign policy that the
executive may wish to advance for political ends.3 24 The existence of
numerous exceptions and limitations to the act of state doctrine is further
evidence of the inadequacies of current act of state theories.
323. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7), supranote 17, § 469.
324. Thus Professor McDougal, who views the act of state doctrine as a doctrine of external
deference, has stated:
In the contemporary world in which people and goods can move so rapidly, and do in fact move so
frequently, it would obviously be impossible for states to maintain any kind of order if they did not
accord a reasonable amount of deference to each other's decisions . . . . It should be observed,
however, . . . that [the act of state doctrine] has nothing whatsoever to do with the internal
constitutional allocation of competence among the different branches of a government within a
particular state such as the United States.
The ForeignAssistanceAct of1965:HearingBefore theHouse Committee on ForeignAffairs,89thCong.,
Ist Sess. 1035 (1965).
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Act of state jurisprudence is in disarray. An uneasy composite of nineteenth century concepts of positivist law and twentieth century principles
of institutional competence and federal supremacy, the act of state doctrine
desperately needs reform. The doctrine must be rethought and recast in
light of its origins, the major themes that have shaped its development, and
the needs of the modem international legal and economic order.
I.
A.

JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE
The OriginalRationale of the Act of State Doctrine and Modern
Determinantsof the Scope andLimits of Sovereign Lawmaking
Authority

The prevailing theoretical framework of the Underhill world of international law was built on positivist concepts of law as based on power and
absolute territoriality. 325 The sovereign's ability to enact valid laws was
based upon its power to enforce its laws within its own territory. 326 The
limits of the sovereign's ability to enact valid laws, or the limits of its
jurisdiction to prescribe valid rules of law, were coextensive with its
territorial boundaries. Within its territory the sovereign had plenary power
to enforce its laws, 327 but these same laws had no effect in the territory of
328
another sovereign.
Originally, the act of state doctrine determined when laws of one
sovereign were entitled to mandatory recognition within the territory of
another sovereign. Under the Underhill doctrine where the foreign sovereign acted within its territory, its acts, by definition valid where done,
were entitled to recognition everywhere, including in the United States.
The original rationale of the act of state doctrine was that where a sovereign
acted within the proper scope of its lawmaking authority, its acts were
entitled to recognition by every other sovereign. The scope and limits of a
325. See RmrATEmENT FOREIGN RELATiONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supranote 15, pt. IV, ch. 1introductory note at 185 ("In the past, the jurisdiction ofa state tomake its law applicable in a transnational context
tended to be determined strictly by formal criteria supposedly derived from concepts ofstate sovereignty
(and power)."). For a general discussion of the historical development of international law and the
influence ofpositivism, seeM. AKEHuRST, supranote 35, at 13-15; M. KAPiLAN &N. KATZENBACH, supra
note 297, at 56-80;seealsoDickinson, ChangingConceptsandtheDoctrineoflncorporation,
26 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 239, 252-253 (1932); Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy andInternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. Rav. 1071,1110-14 (1985).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60, 62-63.
327. Seemhe SchoonerExchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,136 (1812) (Marshall, C.L)
("The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.").
328. See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (Story, LJ)("[The laws of a nation] can
have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction.").
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sovereign's proper lawmaking authority were based on its absolute power
within its own territory.329
Understanding the act of state doctrine's true conceptual origins leads to
a new conception of the doctrine: where a foreign sovereign acts within its
own proper lawmaking authority, or within its proper jurisdiction to prescribe, its acts are entitled to recognition in every other legal system. 330 The
task now is to determine the modern scope and limits of a sovereign's
lawmaking authority, or its jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law.
Today the scope and limits of sovereign lawmaking authority are no
longer based on concepts of power and absolute territoriality. International
law scholars such as Myres McDougal have challenged the rationality of
basing a theory of international law on these rigid concepts. 331 Led by
scholars such as Professor McDougal, Professor Lowenfeld, and (then)
Professor Kingman Brewster, an intellectual movement began to advocate
a thoughtful weighing of relevant interests as the basis of jurisdiction to
332
prescribe:
[L]egislative jurisdiction [or jurisdiction to prescribe] is not like an electric
light-either on or off-as would be a concept based on territory or physical
power. . . . [L]egislative jurisdiction is more like a spectrum of varying
color and intensity, both when viewed by the authority considering the
exercise of legislative jurisdiction and when viewed by a second authority
considering its response. Legislative jurisdiction, in short, is a function of
reason, and of value judgments, not of strength. 333
Concepts of power and absolute territoriality are now tempered by
principles of reason and reasonableness. 334 The rule that the limits of a
sovereign's proper lawmaking authority are coextensive with its territorial
limits has given way to more flexible notions. National laws are now not
only effective within the territory of the prescribing sovereign, but, under
329. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
330. See infra notes 338-42 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power,and Policy: A ContemporaryConception, 82
RECUEJL DESCOURS 137 (1953); McDougal, Law and Power,46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1952).
332. For a discussion of the movement from an approach to legislative jurisdiction based on rigid
concepts to the modern approach based on a thoughtful weighing of interests, see Lowenfeld, PublicLaw
in the InternationalArea: Conflict ofLaws, InternationalLaw, and Some SuggestionsfortheirInteraction, 163 RECUEIL DESCOuRs 311,399-411 (1979). One of the first important works to advocate a flexible
approach to legislative jurisdiction is K. BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(1958), which was published at a time when there was still substantial support for the strict territorial
approach to antitrust legislation set forth by Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 247 (1909). See, e.g., Haight, InternationalandtheExtraterritorialApplication
oftheAntitrust
Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Whitney, SourcesofConflictBetweenlnternationalLawandtheAntitrust
Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954).
333. Lowenfeld, supra note 332, at 326-27.
334. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supranote 15, pt. IV, ch. I introductory note.
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certain circumstances, are now generally recognized as effective within the
335
territory of a foreign sovereign.
The rationale of the original conception of the act of state doctrine was
that acts by a sovereign within its proper lawmaking authority should be
respected by all other sovereigns. Today, concepts of power and absolute
territoriality, the original underpinnings of the doctrine, are no longer the
sole valid measures of sovereign lawmaking authority, and can thus no
longer provide a sufficient basis for the act of state doctrine. Rather, we
must substitute in their place the modem ingredients that determine proper
sovereign lawmaking authority. The proper scope and limits of sovereign
lawmaking authority no longer are based on concepts of power and territoriality alone, but on a careful evaluation of interests, contacts, traditions, and expectations that together determine the reasonableness required
by international law.336 These ingredients, the conceptual descendants of
power and absolute territoriality, are embodied in the modem analysis of a
nation's jurisdiction to prescribe.
B.

Analyzing the Act of State Doctrinein Terms ofJurisdictionto
Prescribe

1.

The GeneralApproach

The thesis of this article is that the act of state doctrine should be
analyzed in terms of the international law doctrine of jurisdiction to
prescribe rules of law. In determining which nation has appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe in a given case, this article employs the analysis set
forth by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Revised) (hereinafter Restatement). 337 The analysis suggested below is
successful in explaining the results reached under many of the previously
decided major act of state cases, clarifies the application of the doctrine to
cases involving intangible property, and offers a more satisfactory account
of cases considered troublesome under current act of state analysis.
First, suppose that a forum court determines that a foreign sovereign has
committed an act that appropriately falls within the foreign sovereign's
jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law. 338 In this case, the act is governed by
the legal system of the foreign sovereign and the rules of that legal system
335. See infra text accompanying note 363.
336. See Lowenfeld, supra note 16, at 95.
337. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), though not yet
promulgated in final form, has been approved by the American Law Institute at its 1986 annual meeting,
ending a seven-year project to revise the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. See supra note 15.
338. For examples of such cases, see infra text accompanying notes 389-415.
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alone should determine the legal consequences of the act. The forum court
should adopt the rules of the foreign sovereign's legal system to adjudicate
the legal status of the act. The reciprocity and deference that states owe
each other in the international legal order outweigh considerations of the
local public policy of the forum, and any local public policy cannot stand in
the way of the result reached under the foreign sovereign's legal system. 339
The same is not true, however, when the act of the foreign sovereign
violates international law. In that case, the international legal order requires
that the forum state disregard the results reached under the foreign sovereign's legal system and refuse to recognize the act. Cases where the
foreign sovereign has appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe would be regarded under traditional act of state analysis as cases where the act of state
340
doctrine barred judicial inquiry.
On the other hand, the forum court may find that the dispute concerns an
act over which the forum has appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe rules of
law. 341 In this case, the legal consequences of the act under the foreign legal
system are entitled to no recognition by the forum and the dispute is
governed solely by forum laws. 342 Cases where the forum sovereign has
appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe would be regarded under traditional
act of state analysis as cases where the act of state doctrine did not apply
and the forum courts were free to examine the validity of the foreign act of
state under local law.
Analyzing the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe
restores the doctrine to its origins as a principle of external deference. To
this extent, the approach to the doctrine suggested by this article is at odds
339. It should be noted that this required transnational recognition of acts within a sovereign's proper
lawmaking authority is a position set forth by the new proposed conception and is not clearly mandated by
international law or the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7), supra
note 17, § 403 comment e.
340. For an analysis in terms ofjurisdiction to prescribe of the major Supreme Court cases applying
the act of state doctrine applicable, see infra text accompanying notes 389-96. The major difference
between the suggested approach and traditional act of state analysis is that under the latter, even acts in
violation of international law are protected by the act of state doctrine. For a critique of this requirement,
see infra text accompanying notes 368-69.
341. See infra text accompanying notes 416-25.
342. The forum may, however, voluntarily decide to recognize foreign law even where the foreign
law, under accepted choice of law rules, is not otherwise the governing law if to do so would further the
aims of the forum. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,221-26 (1941) (recognition of Soviet
Union decree nationalizing property of Soviet citizens in United States was contemplated by a valid
executive agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and served to further policy of
resolving international claims against Soviet Union incident to recognition ofSoviet government); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognition of attempted
Cuban expropriation of property located in United States would further United States policy interests
because presence of Cuban assets would establish a fund from which United States nationals with valid
claims against Cuban government could be compensated).
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with the Sabbatino approach, which views the doctrine as a principle of
internal deference. It is simply not possible to embody all the concerns
underlying the act of state doctrine in a new proposed conception. It should
be emphasized, however, that while issues of institutional competence are
not embodied in the proposed conception itself, nothing precludes a court
from considering such issues as an independent matter once the court
decides that the case falls within the forum's prescriptive jurisdiction. Once
the court finds that a principle of external deference, such as the act of state
doctrine, does not preclude the plaintiff's claim, the court can then consider, as an independent matter, whether a principle of internal deference,
such as the true political question doctrine, compels dismissal of the
case. 343 While jurisdiction to prescribe does not directly incorporate the
concerns of institutional competence underlying the act of state doctrine,
this approach is not inconsistent with an independent consideration of such
concerns, and, to this extent, remains faithful to the Sabbatino approach to
the act of state doctrine.

2.

The Restatement's Approach to the Act of State Doctrine and
Jurisdictionto Prescribe

The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)
is a comprehensive revision of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, promulgated by the American Law Institute
in 1965. 344 In its current draft form, the Restatement contains separate
chapters and sections dealing with the act of state doctrine and jurisdiction
to prescribe. 345 Section 469, setting forth the Restatement's version of the
act of state doctrine, provides in relevant part:
343. An example of a case adopting this approach is Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Plaintiff Ariel Sharon, the former Minister of Defense of the State of Israel, brought a
libel action againstTime, Inc. (Time), publisher of Time Magazine. Sharon alleged that he was defamed
by a Time Magazine article that accused him of wrongdoing in connection with the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Israeli-occupied West Beirut, Lebanon, by members of the Christian Phalangist militia.
Id. at 542. Time moved to dismiss on the basis of the act of state doctrine because the litigation would
require consideration ofthe validity ofvarious acts oftheStateof Israel. The court firstfound that the act of
state doctrine did not apply. See id. at 544-46. The court then considered whether the case was nonjusticiable because of the concerns of the political question doctrine. Weighing the factors set forth by
Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the court held that the case wasjusticiable and deniedTime's motion
to dismiss. See 599 F. Supp. at 548-53.
344. See supra notes 16, 337.
345. The actofstate doctrineis treated inPartIV, chapter6, § 469 oftheseventhtentativedraftofthe
Restatement. Jurisdiction to prescribeis treatedin PartIV, chapter 1,§§ 401-402and404-416ofthesixth
tentative draft, and § 403 of the seventh tentative draft of the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT FoIarnN
RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supranote 15, §§ 401-402,404-416; REsTATmENT FoREIGN RELATONS
(Tent. Draft No. 7), supranote 17, §§ 403,469.
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In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from
examining the validity of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own
territory, or from sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there. 346
Noting that the doctrine "has been a subject of controversy and uncertainty,"' 347 the Restatement's treatment of the doctrine summarizes and
reflects the current judicial confusion concerning the doctrine. For instance, the Restatement retains the rule of territoriality associated with the
Underhill doctrine and positivist concepts of power. As demonstrated
earlier, a theory of the doctrine based on power and absolute territoriality is
seriously flawed for various legal and jurisprudential reasons. 348 Therefore
the Restatement's treatment of the doctrine fails as an analytical tool for
resolving the confusion and uncertainty concerning the doctrine.
Sections 401 through 416 of the Restatement set forth an important and
comprehensive approach to the doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe. 349 The
Restatement, however, apparently sees no analytical connection between
jurisdiction to prescribe and the act of state doctrine. The approach suggested by this article, then, involves a novel application of the doctrine of
jurisdiction to prescribe, one that the Restatement fails to recommend or
recognize.
The principal bases of jurisdiction to prescribe are set forth by section
402 of the Restatement:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; or
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is
directed against the security of the state or a limited class of other state
interests.350
These bases of jurisdiction are discrete and independent and the same
conduct or activity may provide a basis for exercise of jurisdiction by more
(Tent. Draft No. 7), supra note 17, § 469(1).
Id. § 469(1) comment a, at 52.
See infra text accompanying notes 297-301.
See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, §§ 401-402;
RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7), supra note 17, §§ 403,404-416.
350. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402(1); see also infra
text accompanying notes 353-56.
346.

347.
348.
349.
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than one state. Indeed, the Restatement notes that "these rules do not
generally provide for exclusive jurisdiction, [and] overlapping jurisdiction
•. *.is common in respect to transnational transactions. 351 Thus, determining whether a nation has a basis to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction is
merely the first step in deciding, in cases of overlapping jurisdiction, which
nation has the most appropriate claim of prescriptive jurisdiction.
Even where a nation has a basis to exercise jurisdiction, the exercise of
such jurisdiction must be reasonable to be lawful. 352 Under the Restatement, "reasonableness in all the relevant circumstances is. . .an essential
element in determining whether, as a matter of international law, the state
has jurisdiction to prescribe." 353 The Restatement sets forth the following
factors to be weighed in determining the reasonableness of a given exercise
of jurisdiction to prescribe:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating
state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
regulating state;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
354
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
When more than one state has a reasonable basis to exercise jurisdiction
to prescribe over persons or conduct, each state should evaluate its own
351. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, pt. IV, ch. 4, introductory
note. Professor McDougal has noted that "[iln an interdependent world, in which everything affects
everything else and markets and resources are widely distributed, it should not be surprising that these
grants of competence often confer jurisdiction upon more than one state over the same events." The
89thCong., 1st
ForeignAssistanceActof1965:HearingsBeforetheHouseCommitteeonForeignAffairs,
Sess. 1034 (1965).
352. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7), supranote 17, § 403(1).
353. Id. § 403 reporters' notes 10, at 14.
354. Id. § 403(1), (2).
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interests as well as those of the other state in exercising such jurisdiction. 355
Each state should make this evaluation in light of all the relevant factors,
including those set forth above, and "should defer to the other state if that
state's interest is clearly greater.- 356
Within each state, who does the evaluating? According to Professor
Lowenfeld, Associate Reporter of the Restatement, the evaluating is done
by the legislature as it drafts a statute or regulation, and by the courts or
administrative tribunals of the nation seeking to assert its prescriptive
jurisdiction; the evaluating is done as well by the legislature and courts of
the nation that may be affected by the laws in question. 357 The thought is
that although all who do the evaluating may not agree on the same
judgment, each nation will bear reduced resentment and derive some
satisfaction from the knowledge that the other nation has considered the
question of jurisdiction under a common standard. 358
It should be possible in most cases to reach an agreement on which
nation's legal system has a more appropriate basis to exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction. In the words of Professor Lowenfeld, "[i]n short, the jurisdiction is not determined by a fixed standard, but by a standard nonetheless.
Even if drawing fine lines is sometimes difficult, that does not mean that
359
most situations do not fall fairly clearly on one side or the other."
C. Advantages of an Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine in Terms of
Jurisdictionto Prescribe
1. Reciprocal Respect and Mutual Tolerancefor Diverse Legal and
Political Systems
Justifying an analysis of the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction
to prescribe begins with the observation that it is an essential, definitional
element of sovereignty that each nation has the right of self-determination
and the concomitant prerogative to prescribe laws governing the conduct,
relations, status or interests of persons or things within its own territory. 360
Traditionally, a sovereign's authority to prescribe laws was plenary within
its territory, 361 but the sovereign had no competence to act within the
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
1980).
361.
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See id. § 403(3).
Id.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 332, at 330-31.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 16, at 93.
Id. at 95.
See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir.
Id. (citing The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11U.S. (7 Cranch) 116(1812)).
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territory of another nation. 362 Under the Restatement, a nation not only has
prescriptive jurisdiction within its own territory, but also over certain
363
conduct outside of its territory.
Under principles of international law, then, each nation has a proper
domain of legislative competence within which it may legitimately act to
affect the legal status of persons or things. The act of state doctrine, as
interpreted here, recognizes that where a nation acts within its proper
domain of lawmaking authority, every other nation should recognize these
acts even if to do so would contravene local public policy.
This proposed view of the act of state doctrine recognizes that the world
is composed of discrete and diverse legal systems, each of equal status and
each entitled to the respect and recognition accorded to equals so long as
each acts within its proper domain. 364 This view takes a neutral stance with
respect to the substantive content of particular legal systems and the
political philosophy or ideology any legal system may embody. The point
is not that acts reflecting certain political values will be accorded recognition, but that acts by a sovereign within its own and proper domain are
entitled to recognition by all other sovereigns, whatever the values reflected
by those acts, so long as the acts do not violate international law. 365 The
values served by the proposed new conception of the act of state doctrine
are those of reciprocal respect for diverse political and legal systems. As
stated by Professor Falk:
In the presence of diversity, the act of state doctrine performs a valuable
function in international society. It allocates jurisdictional competence on the
basis of a reciprocal pattern of deference by which national actors are given
mutual assurance that their activity will receive universal respect if carried on
within jurisdictional limits (simplified in the Sabbatinodiscussion to refer to
the control of tangible property located within territory). Such deference
accords with the facts of decentralization and ideological cleavage that exist
in international society today.366
362. Id. (quoting The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 363,370 (1824)).
363. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402.
364. Cf International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1357
(9th Cir. 1981) ("In the international sphere each state is viewed as an independent sovereign, equal in
sovereignty to all other states. It is said that an equal holds no power of sovereignty over an equal."
(footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
365. See infra text accompanying notes 368-69.
366. R. FALK, INTERNATIONALSOcEETY, supra note 3, at412; see also Katzenbach,supranote 57, at
1152-53 (mutual tolerance necessary to maintain international integrity of sovereign decisions). Professor Falk's defense of the act of state doctrine is based, in part, upon the following:
[I]n general, courts should avoid interference in the domestic affairs of other states when the subject
matter of disputes illustrates a legitimate diversity of values on the part of two national societies. In
contrast, ifthe diversity can be said to be illegitimate, as when it exhibits an abuse of universal human
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The proposed new conception of the act of state doctrine can also be
justified from a practical point of view. Professor McDougal suggests that
in our modern world, the doctrine serves a particularly useful end:
Like a "full faith and credit clause" in a national constitution, the genuine
"acts of state" doctrine seeks to secure that, despite the continuous movement
of persons and goods, the basic substantive policies of international lawincluding both the jurisdictional policies allocating competence among states
and the basic limitations designed to restrain the arbitrary exercise of this
competence are made effective across nation-state lines. In the contemporary
world in which people and goods can move so rapidly, and do in fact move so
frequently, it would obviously be impossible for states to maintain any kind of
order, much less one of security and abundance, if they did not accord a
reasonable deference to each other's decisions taken in conformity with
international law.367

Under an analysis of the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to
prescribe, forum courts should not recognize foreign sovereign acts that
violate international law. One goal of the proposed new conception of the
act of state doctrine is to promote international order and stability by
requiring all legal systems to recognize acts done within the legislative
competence of a particular legal system. Forum courts would undermine
the stability and integrity of the international legal order if they recognized
acts in violation of international law. In the words of Professor McDougal,
"[i]t would be a complete perversion of. . .this doctrine to convert it into
an independent doctrine for the protection of unlawful transactions. 368 As
a report on the act of state doctrine by the Committee on International Law
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York stated several years
prior to Sabbatino:
A refusal of courts to consider foreign acts of state in light of the law of
nations is not, it should be remembered, merely a neutral doctrine of abstention. On the contrary the effect of such a doctrine is to lend the full protection
rights, then domestic courts fulfill their role by refusing to further the policy of the foreign legal
system. In instances of illegitimate diversity, where a genuine universal sentiment exists, then the
domestic courts properly act as agents of international orderonly ifthey give maximum effect to such
universality.

R. FALK,

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER,

supra note 3, at 72.

The problem with Professor Falk's justification of the doctrine is that it requires courts to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate diversity of values. One might wonder whether domestic courts are suited to decide issues involving the values of national societies and what
standards courts are to use in making determinations of legitimacy with respect to differences in
values across national societies. Under the approach suggested by this article, the application of
the act of state doctrine depends on a determination that is neutral with respect to the substantive
content of political or social ideologies; courts must decide whether the dispute falls within the
legislative competence of the foreign or forum nation.

367.

M.

368.

Id. at 339; see also R.
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supra note 119, at 338.
FALK, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER,

supra note 3, at 72.
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of the United States courts, police and governmental agencies to commercial
or property transactions which are contrary to minimum standard of civilized

conduct ....

369

A necessary corollary of an act of state analysis in terms of jurisdiction to
prescribe is that no legal system is required to recognize sovereign acts
outside the prescriptive jurisdiction of another legal system. A legal system
may voluntarily choose to recognize such acts, but it is not required to do
So.

2.

370

A Valid Basis in FederalLaw

The doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe is governed by rules of international law, 37 1which are part of the federal law of the United States. 372 Thus,
the legal mechanisms of the suggested conception of the act of state
doctrine do not need to be fashioned anew but are an existing, though often
overlooked, part of our law.
Analyzing the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe
satisfies Justice Harlan's quest for a federal basis for the doctrine. 373 The act
of state doctrine, then, would be federal law, binding all fifty states and
subject to the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court.
3.

FundamentalExplanatoryPower

The doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe is a fundamental and powerful
concept that has broad ramifications for many areas of the law. The doctrine
of absolute and restrictive sovereign immunity can also be analyzed in
369. COMMr-rEE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE AssOcIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF NEW
YORK, A RECONSIDERATION OF THE Acr OF STATE Docrin IN UNrrED STATES CouR 8 (1959).
370. See supra note 342.
371. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v.
Crews, 605 F. Supp. 730, 734 (S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp.
1138, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra
note 15, § 401 & comment b.
372. It has been long established that international law is part of the law of the United States.
See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163
(1895); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571,
582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1198 (1986); United States v. Crews, 605 F. Supp. 730,
734 (S.D. Fla. 1985); see also Henkin, supra note 251, at 1561.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17; see also supra note 251. It has been recently
recognized that international law is part of federal law. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423-27 (1964); R. FALK, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 3, at 419; RESTATEmENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 131; Henkin, supra note 251,
at 1557-60.
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terms ofjurisdiction to prescribe. 374 Professor Singer has argued that where
the sovereign has committed acts within its own exclusive jurisdiction to
prescribe, the sovereign has absolute sovereign immunity and is immune
from judgment elsewhere. 375 On the other hand, where the foreign sovereign acts outside its own jurisdiction to prescribe and within the exclusive
prescriptive jurisdiction of the forum, the sovereign has no sovereign
immunity but is viewed as a private actor subject to suit in the courts of the
forum.

376

In addition, the exceptions to the act of state doctrine can be incorporated
directly into the main analysis of jurisdiction to prescribe. Under the
territorial limitation, the act of state doctrine does not apply when the
sovereign attempts to confiscate property located in the territory of the
United States, and United States courts, free to inquire into the validity of
the sovereign act under domestic law, generally will not recognize the
attempted taking. 377 Under the doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe, a
foreign sovereign, absent a showing of an independent basis to exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe, is without a valid basis to enact laws purporting to
affect property located in another sovereign's territory. 378 If the property is
located in the forum, and the foreign sovereign lacks an independent basis
to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over the property, 379 the forum court
need not recognize the acts of the foreign sovereign. Under the Restatement
approach, the element of territoriality is viewed not as an exception but as
an integral element of the analysis of the lawfulness of the foreign sovereign's exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe.
Under the commercial activity exception, the foreign sovereign is not
protected by the act of state doctrine when it descends to the level of the
entrepreneur and pursues purely commercial activities. 380 When this exception applies, foreign sovereign acts are subject to full judicial scrutiny in

374. See Singer, Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 26 HARV. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985). Professor Singer has noted that an approach
based on jurisdiction to prescribe provides a doctrinal basis for dealing with act of state cases
together with those dealing with sovereign immunity. See id. at 14.
375. Id. at 30.
376. Id. at 36.
377. See supra note 182.
378. A state is without a basis to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to "interests
in things, present within [the] territory" of another state. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS

(Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402(1)(b).
379. A state may have a valid basis upon which to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to property located abroad. For example, a state has a basis to prescribe laws affecting the
interests of its nationals in property located in the territory of a foreign sovereign. See
RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402(2).

380.
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See supra text accompanying notes 150, 319.
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United States courts. 381 Under the doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe,
where the foreign sovereign engages in a course of commercial activities
with the forum, the forum may have the appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to those activities. 382 The foreign sovereign cannot then
effectively amend the legal relatiohships arising out of those commercial
dealings because it lacks the appropriate authority to prescribe with respect
to those activities. Any attempts by the foreign sovereign to alter the legal
rights involved in those commercial dealings, then, need not be recognized
by the forum courts. The commercial nature of the activity involved is not
seen as an exception, but as a factor to be weighed in determining which
sovereign has the more appropriate basis to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe.
The treaty exception to the doctrine excepts from the doctrine's scope
issues governed by treaty or other explicit agreement between nations.
Viewed in terms of the proposed new conception of the act of state doctrine,
the treaty exception is simply the recognition that nations may enter into
binding agreements among themselves on particular allocations ofjurisdiction to prescribe.
The human rights exception lifts the bar of the act of state doctrine when
a sovereign act involves an alleged violation of fundamental human rights.
Under the proposed new conception of the doctrine, acts otherwise within
the legislative competence of a particular sovereign should nevertheless be
refused recognition by all other sovereigns if those acts violate interna383
tional law.
The investment of scholarly and judicial energy into developing the
doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe is of great significance in the modern
international legal and economic order. Today, "governments. . .regulate, license, tax, and punish more and more activity of all kinds; and...
more and more activities are carried on across national boundaries-not
only trade, but investment, communicati6ns, transport, [and] financial
transactions. 384 The United States has provoked international tension and
resentment as it has attempted to extend the reach of its antitrust and
securities laws to their farthest limits. 385 The development of an interna381. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976)
(plurality opinion of White, L); see also supra note 150.
382. For an example, see Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B.
529, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 422-25.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 368-69.
384. Lowenfeld, supra note 332, at 325.
385. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597,
609 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Extraterritorial application [of United States antitrust laws] is understandably a matter of concern for the other countries involved. Those nations have sometimes resented
and protested, as excessive intrusions into their own spheres, broad assertions of authority by
American courts."); see J. ATWOOD & K. BREwsTER, ANTnrRusT AND AMERICAN BusiNEss
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tional doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe may help to lessen tension by
promoting a common understanding of agreed upon limits.
The fundamental explanatory power of the doctrine of jurisdiction to
prescribe offers an important promise. Diverse and independent legal
doctrines, such as the act of state doctrine and its exceptions, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, and the extraterritorial application of laws, can be
analyzed under this single, unified approach. Scholars and jurists may even
deem it appropriate to abandon altogether the labels for these independent
doctrines and instead work toward the development of a fundamental
international law of the transnational recognition of sovereign legal systems.
4.

Participationof United States Courts in Developing International
Law
According to many international legal scholars, the most serious vice of
the act of state doctrine is that it inhibits the development of international
law by United States courts. 386 Justice Powell made this point in his
concurring opinion in Citibank:
Until international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of
various countries afford the best means for the development of a respected
body of international law. There is less hope for progress in this longneglected area if the resolution of all disputes involving an "act of state" is
relegated to political rather than judicial processes. 387
Under current act of state analysis, whenever the doctrine is applicable,
United States courts are foreclosed from deciding international law issues.
Scholars have accused the doctrine of requiring the "judicial abdication" 388
§ 1.01, at 5 (2d ed. 1981) ("foreign businesses and governments continue to state their
irritated astonishment when United States antitrust laws are imposed on arrangements thought to
be beyond the proper reach of American law"); Comment, The Sovereign Compulsion Defense in
Antitrust Actions and the Role of Statements by Foreign Governments, 62 WASH. L. REV. 129, 130
(1987) ("Use of United States domestic law to regulate conduct abroad has evoked a considerable
number of hostile responses from foreign governments." (footnote omitted)); see also A. NEAL &
ABROAD

D. GOYDER, THE ANTrrRUST LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 346-48, 357-68 (3d ed.
1980); THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: DIRECT INVESTMENT IN PER-

SPECTIVE 60 (S.Rolfe & W. Damm eds. 1970); RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No.
6), supra note 15, introductory note.
386. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 3, at 381-84; Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts
in the InternationalLegal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 11 (1970); Mathias, supra note 3, at 414;
Wallace, supra note 13, at 25. See also Act of State Hearings, supra note 3, at 28 (abolishing the
act of state doctrine "would enhance the capacity of the courts of the United States to contribute
to the progressive and sound development of international law") (prepared statement of Prof. Don

Wallace, Jr.).
387.

First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972) (Powell, J.,

concurring in the judgment).
388. Lillich, supra note 386, at 11.
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by United States courts of their responsibility to contribute to international
law.
The approach to the doctrine suggested by this article, because it is based
upon the international law doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe, answers the
most persistent criticism of the doctrine by legal scholars-that it arrests
the development of international law by United States courts.
Clarificationof CurrentAct of State Cases Involving Intangible
Property

5.

As set forth in greater detail below, jurisdiction to prescribe provides a
rational and understandable approach for resolving the increasing number
of act of state cases involving intangible property. Finding that existing act
of state jurisprudence cannot resolve disputes involving sovereign acts
affecting intangible property, courts and commentators have fashioned new
tests. Yet these new tests consist of fresh sets of rules with no apparent
connection to existing rules already crowding the conceptual warehouse of
act of state theories. The proposed new conception of the act of state
doctrine will simplify, not multiply, the number of rules applicable under
the act of state doctrine.
Applying an Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine in Terms of

D.

Jurisdictionto Prescribe
1. PrescriptiveJurisdictionof the ForeignSovereign
Oetjen389 and Ricaud390 provide rare examples of acts that fall within the

foreign sovereign's exclusive jurisdiction to prescribe. Both cases involved
the seizure of property by a Mexican general from citizens of Mexico. 391
The property eventually entered the United States where the owners or their
successors in interest asserted ownership. The Mexican government, in
seizing the property from its own citizens, performed an act within its own
jurisdiction to prescribe. 392 Moreover, no other nation could claim a basis
of jurisdiction to prescribe over the acts in question. The acts of the
Mexican government, then, fell within its exclusive jurisdiction to prescribe. Because the acts of the Mexican government were within its proper
sphere of legislative competence and were not in violation of international
389.
390.
391.
392.

246
246
See
See

U.S. 297 (1918); see supra text accompanying notes 70-75 and supra note 75.
U.S. 304 (1918); see supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
supra text accompanying note 72.
RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402(1)(b).
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law, 393 they

were entitled to recognition in all other legal systems, includ394
ing the courts of the United States.
Underhill is a case in which prescriptive jurisdiction rests, on balance,
with the foreign sovereign. The nationality of plaintiff Underhill provided a
basis for the United States to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe. 395 However,
the entire episode occurred in Venezuela, where General Hernandez ordered Underhill to operate his water works for the revolutionary army.
Venezuela thus had a more reasonable claim to regulate conduct occurring
396
within its territory as well as the status of persons within its territory.
Likewise, InternationalAssociation ofMachinists (IAM) v. OPEC397 is a
case in which jurisdiction to prescribe rests, on balance, with the foreign
sovereign. A labor union charged the OPEC member nations with pricefixing in violation of the United States antitrust laws. 398 The Ninth Circuit
399
held that the act of state doctrine applied to bar the plaintiff's complaint.
Framed in light of the present analysis, the issue in OPEC was whether the
United States could properly assert its jurisdiction to prescribe its antitrust
laws to govern conduct by the OPEC nations.
There was precedent in the Ninth Circuit for an analysis of the issues in
OPEC in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe. A few years prior to OPEC, the
Ninth Circuit considered the question of the extraterritorial reach of the
antitrust laws in a similar case. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,400 an American milling manufacturer claimed that defendants
had conspired with Honduran officials to force plaintiff out of the lumber
business in that country. 40 1 The district court had dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the alleged conspiracy did not produce a substantial
effect on commerce within the United States. 40 2 In its opinion, the Ninth
393. See De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985)
("[International law ...
does not purport to interfere with the relations between a nation and its
own citizens . . . . [E]ven if [Nicaragua's] actions might have violated international law had they
been taken with respect to an alien's property, [because] they [confiscated] property rights of a
Nicaraguan national . . . [,] they were outside the ambit of international law."); see also United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1936) ("What another country has done in the way of
taking over property of its nationals . . . is not a matter for judicial consideration here. Such
nationals must look to their own government for any redress to which they may be entitled.").
394. See supra text accompanying notes 338-39.
395. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402(2).
396. Id. § 402(l)(a),(b).
397. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 164-75.
398. 649 F.2d at 1355.
399. Id. at 1358-62.
400. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
401. Id. at 604-05.
402. The district court applied the then prevailing standard for determining the extraterritorial
reach of the United States antitrust laws. Under the ALCOA standard set forth by Judge Learned
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Circuit identified one of the major issues of the case:
question which is unique to the international setting of
[T]here is the.
whether the interests of, and links to, the United States-including the
magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce-are sufficiently
strong vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extrater4 03
ritorial authority.
Finding that the effects test adopted by the district court was too rigid, the
Ninth Circuit stated:
An effect on United States commerce, although necessary to the exercise of
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to
determine whether American authority shouldbe asserted in a given case as a
matter of international comity and fairness. In some cases, the application of
the direct and substantial test in the international context might open the door
too widely by sanctioning jurisdiction over an action when these considerations would indicate dismissal. At other times, it may fail in the other
direction, dismissing a case for which comity and fairness do not require
forebearance, thus closing the jurisdictional door too tightly-for the Sherman Act does reach some restraints which do not have both a direct and
substantial effect on the foreign commerce of the United States. A more
comprehensive inquiry is necessary. . . .What we prefer is an evaluation
and balancing of the relevant considerations in each case-in the words of
4
Kingman Brewster, a "jurisdictional rule of reason." 04
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the United States' jurisdiction to prescribe its antitrust laws
reached the conduct in question. 4° 5
Finding the Timberlane analysis persuasive, the Third Circuit adopted its
analysis in another case involving the extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws. In ManningtonMills v. Congoleum Corp.,406 Mannington Mills, an American manufacturer of vinyl floor coverings, alleged

that Congoleum fraudulently had procured patents abroad for vinyl and, in
violation of the Sherman Act, was threatening to bring infringement
actions abroad against Mannington Mills. 40 7 The district court ruled in
Hand, proven effects on American commerce that were intended may subject wholly foreign conduct to jurisdiction. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d
Cir. 1945); see also I J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, JR., supra note 385, §§ 6.05-.08, at 147-56.
403. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
404. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting K. BREwsTER, JR., ANTITRusT AND AMERIcAN Bust-

NESS ABROAD 446 (1958)).
405. On remand, however, the district court found that the antitrust laws did not reach the
conduct in question and again dismissed the case. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 574 F Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 749 F2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
406. 595 F 2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
407. Id. at 1290.
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favor of Congoleum on the ground that the act of state doctrine barred the
antitrust action. 408 The Third Circuit disagreed that the doctrine applied. 40 9
The Third Circuit viewed the extraterritorial application of the antitrust
laws as a dispositive issue:
This may, indeed, be a situation where the consequences to the American
economy and policy permit no alternative to firm judicial action enforcing our
antitrust laws abroad. But before that step is taken, there should be a weighing
of competing interests.
In [Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit] adopted a balancing process in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised, an approach
410
with which we find ourselves in substantial agreement.
The Mannington Mills court then set forth factors to be weighed in
determining whether the antitrust laws applied extraterritorially in a given
case, factors similar to the Restatement's factors of the reasonableness of a
given exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe. 41u
An analysis in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe, reflected in the approaches used by Timberlane and ManningtonMills, offers a better understanding of OPEC. To start with, under section 402(1)(c), 412 the United
States has a basis to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe because the OPEC
nations have engaged in conduct having a substantial effect within the
United States. However, the exercise of jurisdiction must still meet the
reasonableness criteria of section 403. 4 13 The United States seeks to
408. Id.
409. Id. at 1293-94.
410. Id. at 1296, 1297.
411. The factors listed by the court were:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98. Commentators have noted that "Timberlane and Mannington Mills provide an
analytically sound framework for determining the proper scope of Sherman Act extraterritorial
jurisdiction." I J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER JR., supra note 385, § 6.22, at 180.
412. See RESTATEMENT FOREaIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402(l)(c).
413.
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See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 7), supra note 17, § 403.
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regulate the actual conduct of foreign nations, which is an intrusion into the
most basic and primary area of the other countries' jurisdiction. 4 14 To be
reasonable, such an intrusion must meet a heavy burden of showing that the
basic harm is so serious that an intrusion is justified and, that without such
an intrusion, the basic harm will continue. 415 It is doubtful that the forum
nation, here the United States, can show that its exercise of jurisdiction to
prescribe price-fixing laws reasonably extends to the OPEC nations. Accordingly, the complaint should have been dismissed on the ground that the
antitrust laws do not reach, in this case, the activities of OPEC member
nations.
2.

PrescriptiveJurisdictionof the Forum

In Republic of Iraq v. FirstNational City Bank,416 jurisdiction to prescribe rests, on balance, with the forum nation. In that case, the Republic of
Iraq issued decrees that purported to confiscate the property of its deposed
monarch, King Faisal ]1.417 The property was held in deposit and custody
accounts by an American bank in New York City.418 Iraq's only connection
to the accounts was based on the nationality of the holder of those accounts.
Judge Friendly refused to recognize Iraq's claim that it had prescriptive
jurisdiction over the accounts:
Although the nationality of King Faisal provided a jurisdictional basis for the
Republic of Iraq to prescribe a rule relating to his property outside Iraq...
[,] this simply gives the confiscation decree a claim to consideration by the
forum which, in the absence of such jurisdiction, it would not possess-not a
which. . . the decree would enjoy
basis for insisting on the absolute respect
419
as to property within Iraq at the time.
The court went on to hold the act of state doctrine inapplicable and refused
to recognize the confiscation decrees. 420 Judge Friendly's holding is consistent with the view that "[t]erritoriality is considered the normal, and
nationality the exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction." 421
414. As the Ninth Circuit stated, plaintiff's request that OPEC be found liable under United
States antitrust laws "would in effect amount to an order from a domestic court instructing a
foreign sovereign to alter its chosen means of allocating and profiting from its own valuable natural resources." International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F2d 1354,
1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
415. Cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 332, at 386.
416. 353 E2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
417. 353 F.2d at 49.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 51.

420.

Id.

421.

RESTATEmENT FOREIGN RELATIoNs (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402 comment b.
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Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,422 a sovereign

immunity case, is another example in which jurisdiction to prescribe rests,
on balance, with the forum. The case involved a contract for the purchase
by the Nigerian Ministry of Defense of cement to be used for building
houses, factories, and army barracks. 423 Lord Denning found that the
contracts were private activity and thus could not provide the basis of a
claim of sovereign immunity. He continued:
There is another answer. Trendtex here are not suing on the contracts of
purchase. They are claiming on the letter of credit which is an entirely
separate contract. It was a straightforward commercial transaction. The letter
of credit was issued in London through a London bank in the ordinary course
of commercial dealings. It is completely within the territorial jurisdiction of
our courts. I do not think it is open to the Government of Nigeria to claim
sovereign immunity in respect of it. 424
Lord Denning's statement that the letter of credit was within the "territorial
jurisdiction" of the English courts is a reference to the English doctrine of
the proper law of a contract. 425 In Trendtex, the proper law of the contract
was English law because England had proper jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to commercial transactions in London by a London bank. English
law alone, then, determined rights and liabilities under the contract.
Nigeria's attempt to alter the liabilities under the contract, whether based
on a claim of sovereign immunity or the act of state doctrine, was therefore
irrelevant.
3.

Recent Cases Involving IntangibleProperty

Faced with novel issues of acts of state affecting intangible property,
courts continued to think in terms of rigid concepts of territoriality. As a
result, courts attempted to situate intangible property, an enterprise that
presented inherent difficulties because intangible property, by definition,
has no physical location. Searching for guidance, courts resurrected the
Harris rule, which locates the debt where courts can obtain personal
426
jurisdiction over the debtor.
422.
423.
424.

[19771 1 Q.B. 529.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 558.

425.

See 2 J.H.C. MORRIS, L. COLLINS, J.D. MCCLEAN & M. MANN, supra note 238:

The term "proper law of a contract" means the system of law by which the parties intended
the contract to be governed, or, where their intention is neither expressed nor to be inferred
from the circumstances, the system of law with which the transaction has its closest and

most real connection.
Id. at 747; see also P.M. NORTH, CHESHIRE & NORTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 195-212 (10th
ed. 1979).

426.
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See supra text accompanying notes 278-83.
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Aside from practical difficulties associated with the rule,427 the Harris
approach is inappropriate in the act of state context because it concerns
jurisdiction to adjudicate rather than jurisdiction to prescribe. Today,
Harris stands for the simple proposition that where a court has personal
jurisdiction over a debtor consistent with due process requirements, the
court can render a valid judgment adjudicating that debtor's personal
liability.428 Whether a forum court has the power to render a valid judgment, however, does not address act of state concerns. Assuming a forum
court has jurisdiction to adjudicate, the act of state doctrine concerns what
effect the forum court should accord to an act of state in the exercise of that
adjudicative jurisdiction. 429
The transnational effect of an act of state depends on whether the state
had the competence to affect the legal rights involved. That is an issue of
jurisdiction to prescribe. An act of state analysis based upon the Harrisrule
of adjudicative jurisdiction is thus fundamentally misdirected. In the words
of Professor Lowenfeld, "[T]he unquestioned existence of judicial jurisdiction over a person, firm, or ship--even when it is based on an activitydoes not necessarily carry with it legislative jurisdiction over all aspects of
that activity." 430
Under the proposed new conception of the act of state doctrine, the
relevant inquiry is whether the foreign sovereign has proper jurisdiction to
prescribe over the legal source of the intangible property rights. In cases
such as AlliedBank involving sovereign defaults on loan agreements, 431 the
central issue is whether the foreign sovereign has the legislative competence to alter the loan contract rights in dispute. In particular, the crucial
issue in Allied Bank was whether Costa Rica had the appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to the loan contracts.
On one hand, under section 402, both the United States and Costa Rica
have a basis to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to the loan
agreements. The United States' claim is based on links of territoriality
under section 402(1)(a)-(c). 432 Some negotiations for the contract took
place in the United States; Allied Bank, the designated agent, was located
427. See supra text accompanying notes 284-88.
428. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), substantially overruled Harris on its facts. See
supra note 187.
429. If the forum court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate, the act of state issue would
not arise at all because the party who asserts the act of state doctrine should move to dismiss for
lack of territorial jurisdiction.
430. Lowenfeld, supra note 332; see REsTATEMENT FoREIGN RLATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6),
supra note 15, § 421 comment a.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 192-206.
432. See RESTATEmENT FoPEION RELATioNs (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15,
§ 402(1)(a)-(c). For the text of § 402(l)(a)-(c), see supra text accompanying note 350.
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in New York City; the Costa Rica defendants submitted to the jurisdiction
of the New York courts, agreed to make payments in New York, and agreed
433
to choose New York law as the governing law of the contract.
On the other hand, Costa Rica also had a basis to exercise jurisdiction
under Section 402(2) since it sought to regulate "the activities, status,
interests or relations of its nationals outside as well as inside its territory." 434 In Allied Bank, Costa Rica sought to assert, on the basis of the
nationality of one of the contracting parties, its prescriptive jurisdiction to
alter the legal rights under the loan contracts. The critical inquiry then
becomes whether the exercise of this jurisdiction is reasonable under
section 403. A step-by-step analysis of section 403 criteria indicates that
the appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe rests, on balance, with the United
States.
Subsection (a)(i)-(ii). The extent to which the activity takesplace or has
an effect within the regulatingstate. Costa Rica's claim would be strengthened if it could demonstrate that the currency decrees were crucial to the
preservation of its economy. Still, these factors weigh in favor of Costa
Rica's exercise of jurisdiction.
Subsection (b). Connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the persons principally
responsiblefor the activity to be regulated. Costa Rica has a reasonable
claim that it should be able to prescribe law governing the conduct of its
national banks. Costa Rica's case for controls is reasonable.
Subsections (c)-(d). The character of the activity to be regulated,
importance of regulation to the regulating state, extent to which other
states regulate such activities, desirability of such controls and the existence ofjustified expectations. Costa Rica seeks to regulate private contracts between a syndicate of United States commercial banks and its own
national banks. In the field of contract law, the protection of justified
expectations and predictability of results is particularly important. These
factors form part of the basic policies underlying the field of contract law.435
The importance of the currency decrees to the preservation of Costa
Rica's economy must be considered in light of customary international
banking practices. The American banks were not seeking to plunge Costa
Rica into economic bankruptcy by insisting on payment under the strict
terms of the loan agreements. Rather, as is customary in the field of
international banking, the American banks wanted to renegotiate and
433. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
434.
435.

RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 15, § 402(2).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 188 (1971).
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reschedule the existing loan repayment schedule in a way that would both
preserve their own rights and present Costa Rica with a realistic and
436
practicable repayment schedule.
Moreover, Costa Rica sought to regulate an activity not normally considered to be subject to regulation by states. In general, foreign moratoria laws
are not recognized by the forum where the contract is payable in the forum
state. For example, in Kleinwort Sons & Co. v. UngarischeBaumwolle
IndustrieA.G., 437 the Court of Appeal enforced in England a contract for
the payment of certain bills by a Hungarian bank. After the Hungarian and
English parties had entered into the contract, the Hungarian government
enacted laws prohibiting Hungarian subjects from paying money outside
Hungary without the consent of the Hungarian national bank. The Court of
Appeal ruled that the proper law of the contract was English law and that
the contract was thus enforceable in the English courts. 438 Lord du Parq
stated:
I do not say for a moment that a sovereign State may not legislate to control the
acts of its subjects beyond its borders. Of course it may. Nothing can prevent a
sovereign State from so legislating, and it is a matter with which these Courts
have no concern. But it is right that it should be understood that, if a sovereign
State legislates so as to interfere with the acts of its subjects outside its own
territory and, in a sense, its own jurisdiction, then it cannot expect-and I
suppose no State would expect-that courts of another country will enforce
439
that legislation at the expense of their own laws.
A leading English commentator has noted that currency regulations of the
kind enacted by Costa Rica are not normally entitled to recognition:
If the contract is governed by the law of a country other than the restricting
country, no effect can be attributed to the exchange control regulations of the
restricting country which interfere with the performance of the contract as
contemplated by the parties. In other words, when it comes to the performance of an English contract, the existence of exchange restrictions in a
foreign country need not, as a matter of principle, be considered ...
436. See Hurlock, Advising Sovereign Clients on the Renegotiation of Their External Indebtedness, 23 CoTJM. . TRANsNAT'L L. 29, 29 (1984) (renegotiation of all or some portion of borrowing countries' indebtedness common practice during the past decade).
437. [1939] 2 K.B. 678 (K.B.D.), aff'd, id. at 690 (C.A.).
438. Id. at 683; see also Mann, Sacrosanctity of ForeignAct of State, 59 L.Q. REv. 42, 53
(1959) (contractual obligations not subject to law of the situs of the obligation but to the proper
law governing the contract).
439. [1939] 2 K.B. at 699; see also Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., [1963] 2 Q.B.
352, 371; Toprak v. FImagrain, [1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 98 (C.A.); Dalmia Dairy Indus. v. National
Bank, [1978] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 223; In re Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956] All E.R. 129, 135; Cargo
Motor Corp. Ltd. v. Tofalos Transp. Ltd., [1972] S. Aft. L. Rep. 186; Commonwealth Dev. Corp.
v. Central African Power Corp., [1968] 3 Afk. L. Rep. 416 (High Ct. Zambia); 2 J.H.C. MoRius,
L. CoLuNs, J.D. McCLEAN & M. MANN, supra note 238, at 797-98, 1025-26.
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Its most important application in practice is to be found where under an
English contract money is due in England and the debtor resides in a
restricting State which makes it impossible for him to discharge his obligations. Such consequences of the restricting State's laws are wholly immaterial, because they are extraneous to a contract subject to English law and
440
performable in England.

In the United States, courts have refused to recognize foreign moratoria
laws purporting to alter contracts payable in the United States. 44 1 With
respect to the currency decrees involved in Allied Bank, then, the customary legal practice of the forum nation is to deny recognition. 442
An additional factor to be considered is the desirability of the regulation.
In this respect, recognition of Costa Rica's jurisdiction to annul these loan
agreements would undermine the basic framework of international lending,
which is built upon the expectation that nations cannot unilaterally suspend
their debt obligations. 443 Further, a finding of Costa Rican jurisdiction
440.

EA. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 418-19 (1982) (emphasis in original).

441. See Anglo-Continentale Treuhand, A.G. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 81 F.2d I1,12 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655 (1936); Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens
& Halske A.G., 15 F. Supp. 927, 929 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on opinion below, 84 R2d 993 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 585 (1936); Irving Trust Co. v. Mamidakis, No. 78-0266 (S.D.N.Y. Oct
18, 1978); Pan Am. Sec. Corp. v. Fried, Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 256 A.D. 955, 10 N.Y.S.2d
205 (1939); South Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Columbian Petroleum Co., 177 Misc. 756, 31
N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941); Barnes v. United Steel Works Corp., 11 N.Y.S.2d 161 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1939); Deutsch v. Gutehoffnungshutte, Aktienverein Fur Bergbau & Huttenbetrieb, 168
Misc. 872, 6 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938); Glynn v. United States Steel Works Corp., 160
Misc. 405, 289 N.Y.S. 1037 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935); Marks v. United Steel Works Corp., 160
Misc. 678, 289 N.Y.S. 1035 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935).
442. The Allied Bank court did not consider whether the loan agreements at issue were "exchange contracts" within the meaning of article VIII, section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund (the Bretton Woods Agreement), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No.
6748, and Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. Article VIII, section 2(b) provides
in relevant part that "[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which
are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." Article VIII,
section 2(b) has been enacted into United States law by 22 U.S.C. § 286h (1982).
Both the United States and Costa Rica are signatories to the Bretton Woods Agreement and a
broad interpretation of "exchange contracts" could encompass the loan agreements at issue in
Allied Bank. See, e.g., 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 425 (1982); Williams,

ExtraterritorialEnforcement of Exchange Control Regulations Under the InternationalMonetary
Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319, 338 (1975). It is conceivable that the applicability of
article VIII, section 2(b) was not raised in Allied Bank because in a related case involving the
same Costa Rican currency regulations, a district court held that similar loan agreements were not
"exchange contracts" within the meaning of the Bretton Woods Agreement. See Libra Bank, Ltd.
v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A. 570 F. Supp. 870, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
443. See Warden, supra note 4, at 295-96, 300 (an essential premise underlying international
banking transactions is that contractual undertakings governed by United States law cannot be
extinguished by a foreign state's laws); see also de Larosiere, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Remarks Before the Institute of Foreign Bankers, May 2, 1984, in 13 IMF
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would likely reduce the possibility of future lending by private creditors to
prospect that might lead to the
what they perceive to be high-risk nations, a 444

economic ruin of many developing nations.

Subsections (e)-(f). The importance of the regulationto the international system and the consistency of the regulation with traditions of the
international system. Some of the facts relevant to these factors have
already been discussed above. Additionally, under the auspices of the
International Monetary Fund, 445 debtor and creditor nations have engaged
in an effort to resolve the international debt crisis by voluntary arrangethat the
ment. The effort is undertaken, however, with the assumption 446
enforceable.
remain
nations
debtor
the
of
underlying obligations
Subsections (g)-(h). The interest of another state in regulating the
activity and likelihood of conflict with other states. The interests of Costa
Rica and other debtor nations in regulating their debt obligations are
balanced by the interest of the United States and other creditor nations in
preserving their right to payment. Preservation of the status quo in international lending, which recognizes the enforceability of the underlying debt
SuRvEY 145, 146 (May 21, 1984) (solution to international debt crisis requires three elements:
strong adjustment efforts by debtor countries, supportive and cooperative action on the part of the
international financiers, and a revitalization of world trade to be achieved by a strengthening of
policies by the industrial countries); Hoffman & Deming, supra note 6, at 506-08 (lending banks
have established expectations that loan agreements payable in the United States are enforceable).
444. See de Larosiere, supra note 443, at 146 ("the interdependence of the global financing
and trading system meant that all parties would lose-and lose heavily-in the event of defaults
and the interruption of financial flows and proliferation of trade and payments restrictions that
would inevitably have ensued"); Tigert, supra note 6, at 520 (denying foreign creditors their bargained-for contractual rights to enforce loan agreements will inevitably have an adverse effect
upon future lending to debtor countries). The continued lending by private creditors, such as
American banks, is essential to the resolution of the international crisis. See Hurlock, supra note
436, at 45; Robichek, The InternationalMonetary Fund: An Arbiter in the Debt Restructuring
Process, 23 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 151-52 (1984).
445. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization and a specialized agency of the United Nations. See Gold, The InternationalMonetary Fund, in 2 A LAwYER's GuIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACrIONS 3, 7 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace, Jr. eds.
1979). The IMF was established by representatives of forty-four nations at the conclusion of the
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, which was held in July 1944 in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire. See Asherman, The InternationalMonetary Fund: A History of Compromise, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 235, 240 (1984).
Among the stated objectives of the IMF are the promotion of international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly financial and economic conditions. See Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S.
39, as amended May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, and Apr. 30, 1976, art. I (i)
& (iii), art. IV, § 1, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2205, 2208, T.I.A.S. No. 8937; see also Gold, supra, at 7;
Silard, The Role of the InternationalMonetary Fund, 32 AM. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1982). For a
succinct discussion of the role of the IMF in the current debt crisis, see Robichek, supra note
444, at 143. Currently, 151 nations are members of the IMF. IMF, Fact Sheet, External Relations
Dep't (Sept. 1986) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
446. See Tigert, supra note 6, at 511-12; see also supra note 443.
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obligation, is of vital interest to many nations. Recognition of debtornations' jurisdiction to suspend debt would undoubtedly lead to serious
conflicts with creditor nations.
Weighing the Restatement's criteria together, Costa Rica's exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to the loan agreement is unreasonable. However, the important point is that instead of relying on the primitive
yes/no power theory of jurisdiction to prescribe, the Allied Bank court
should have engaged in some version of the analysis set forth above. Even if
reasonable persons may differ about the judgment reached in some cases,
an analysis of the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe
offers a rational approach to intangible property disputes. Moreover, because jurisdiction to prescribe is part of international law, the settlement of
intangible property disputes according to agreed upon standards may help
to reduce resentment and lessen tension among nations with conflicting
claims to intangible property.
4.

Troublesome Cases Under CurrentAct of State Analysis

Preceding sections have examined several major act of state cases and
have demonstrated that an analysis of the act of state doctrine in terms of
jurisdiction to prescribe is consistent with and explains the results reached
in those cases. This section analyzes act of state cases reaching results
many lawyers find disturbing or incorrect. It is a virtue of a legal theory that
it can both explain what are generally regarded as correct precedents and
demonstrate mistakes in what are generally regarded as troublesome or
incorrect precedents.
An example of a troublesome result is that reached in DeRoburt v.
Gannett Co.44 7 There, DeRoburt, the president of Nauru, one of the
Marshall Island Republics, sued an American publisher for libel. 448 DeRoburt alleged that the publisher's newspapers, disseminated in the United
States and in Nauru, contained defamatory statements accusing him of
making illegal loans. 449 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that
DeRoburt's complaint inevitably would require inquiry into his motives for
making the loans and that the act of state doctrine barred such inquiry. 450 In
effect, then, the courts invoked the act of state doctrine to foreclose judicial
inquiry even when requested by the foreign sovereign itself. One commentator labeled this result "absurd. "451
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
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733 F2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Bazyler, supra note 3, at 346 n.123.
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Under the proposed new conception of the act of state doctrine, the
United States has the appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to
the activities of an American newspaper company. Based on connections of
nationality and territoriality, the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in this
case is reasonable. The district court should have decided DeRoburt's libel
claim under American law.
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 452 Hunt alleged that seven American oil
companies induced him to resist Colonel Qadhafi's demands for greater
profits because they knew such intransigence would lead to confiscation of
Hunt's oil properties by Libya. 453 Although Hunt in no way challenged the
legality of the confiscation by Libya, the Second Circuit held that his suit
was barred since it would require inquiry into the motives of the Libyan
government. 454 The court's decision has been criticized as applying the act
1 55
of state doctrine in an "unprecedentedly broad manner.' 4
Unlike the situation in OPEC where the plaintiff asserted that United
States antitrust laws governed the conduct of the foreign sovereigns themselves, the Hunt court did not need to decide whether antitrust laws applied
to Libya because the legality of Libya's conduct was not at issue. Rather,
under an analysis of the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to
prescribe, the court should have decided whether United States antitrust
laws reached the activities abroad of the seven oil companies. It is significant in this regard that the seven oil companies held a crucial secret meeting
in the United States, where they allegedly decided to sabotage Hunt's
Libyan oil operation. 456 The United States has a reasonable claim to
regulate the conduct of its citizens abroad, especially when its citizens plot,
in the United States, a global effort to limit the price and supply of oil sold
in the United States, a matter of vital national concern.
5. Complexity and Manageabilityof an Analysis of the Act of State
Doctrine in Terms of Jurisdictionto Prescribe
An analysis of the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to
prescribe involves a multivariable approach. Determining whether a given
452. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); see supra text accompanying
notes 153-163.
453. 550 F.2d at 72.
454. Id. at 73.
455. Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction, supra note 163, at 1259.
456. One factor that supports a finding of jurisdiction to prescribe in the forum is the occurrence of significant activity in the forum nation. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, JR., supra
note 385, § 6.12, at 164.; K. BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERCAN BusINEss ABROAD 293
(1958). In Hunt, the allegedly crucial conspiratorial agreement occurred in the United States. See
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
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exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe is reasonable depends upon a weighing
of a variety of factors and is, in essence, a balancing test. While one of the
virtues of a balancing test is its flexibility, unpredictability and perceived
arbitrariness and unfairness can be some of its vices. In addition, an
analysis in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe may involve complex, prolonged, and expensive litigation.
While the proposed new conception may have its disadvantages, it is
equally clear that the traditional approach to the act of state doctrine based
upon concepts of power and absolute territoriality is unacceptable. A
multivariable approach to the act of state doctrine is clearly less predictable
than the yes/no theory of the doctrine based on power and territoriality. On
the other hand, we should never seek to advance the aims of predictability at
the expense of rationality. Our search should not be for maximum certainty,
but for maximum rationality. 457 Absent treaties or other explicit agreements among nations establishing a framework for the transnational recognition of sovereign acts, there may be no viable alternative to a multivariable approach to the act of state doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In its origins, the act of state doctrine was rooted in Austin's positivist
theory that sovereign power is the ultimate source of law. This basic
principle led to the corollary principle that sovereign laws were effective
only within the sovereign's territory. Since the sovereign has plenary power
to back its commands within, but only within, its territory, its laws were
effective within, but only within, the sovereign's territory. Beale's vested
rights theory of choice of law supplied the necessary step for the act of state
doctrine. Legal rights are created by laws of the sovereign and only the laws
that created those rights can determine their nature and extent. If an act is
valid under the law of the place where the act is done, then the validity of
that act cannot be questioned. Within its territory, the sovereign's power to
back its commands is absolute; thus, the sovereign's acts, by definition
legally valid in the sovereign's own legal system, are equally valid in every
other legal system. Originally, the act of state doctrine was a choice of law
theory and a principle of external deference.
Fundamental changes in American jurisprudence between the doctrine's
birth in Underhill and its reconsideration in Sabbatino led the Supreme
Court to steer the development of the doctrine in a radically different
457. Cf Lowenfeld, supra note 332, at 329 (in fashioning test for legislative jurisdiction,
search should not be for a "minimum test-'step no further or you will be in violation' . . .[:]
search should not be for minimum acceptability, but for maximum rationality").
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direction. Austin's view that sovereign power could be the basis of a
rational theory of law had been widely and successfully attacked by
eminent philosophers. Beale's vested rights theory, conceptually linked to
Austin's power theory, met a similar fate at the hands of equally eminent
lawyers. In an unrelated but monumental development, the Supreme Court
had established the regime of ErieRailroadv. Tompkins. As a consequence
of Erie and its progeny, the SabbatinoCourt could no longer ground the act
of state doctrine in the field of conflict of laws because to do so would have
posited the doctrine as a matter of state law, subject to the ultimate control
of the state courts, and binding upon the federal courts. Finding the foreign
policy implications of the act of state doctrine required that it be governed
by federal law, the Sabbatino Court faced the task of finding a valid basis
for the doctrine in federal law.
Sabbatinofound such a valid federal basis in the principle of separation
of powers. Since Sabbatino,most courts believe that the primary justification for the doctrine lies in the deference that the judiciary owes to the
executive in its conduct of foreign affairs. Sabbatinothus transformed the
doctrine from a principle of external deference to one of internal deference.
Following Sabbatino, some courts interpreted the doctrine to require ready
and meek judicial compliance with the views of the executive in act of state
cases. At the same time, other courts linked acts of state with nonjusticiable
political questions. An examination of these views revealed that each has
serious flaws.
With the rise of international financial markets and the international debt
crisis, courts began to apply the act of state doctrine to sovereign acts
affecting intangible property and contract rights. Courts were perplexed,
however, because of the territorial limitation to the doctrine. Although
Sabbatinotransformed the doctrine from a principle of external deference
to one of internal deference, the Supreme Court, without explanation,
retained the doctrine's territorial limitation, the principal qualification of
the doctrine when it was conceived as one of external deference. As set
forth by Sabbatino,the act of state doctrine only applies when the sovereign
acts to take property located within its own territory. Given this limitation,
courts were compelled to fashion tests, which proved to be unsatisfactory,
to determine the situs of intangible property.
Today, act of state jurisprudence is in great need of reform. None of the
theories of the doctrine can withstand challenge and the theories, taken
together, cannotjustify the doctrine because they are inconsistent with each
other. Courts, not realizing that the doctrine has witnessed a tortuous and
splintered development, apply inconsistent theories. The result is a chronic
and deep dissatisfaction with a doctrine that, despite cries for its abolition,
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shows no signs of disappearing, and, indeed, continues to grow in application and importance in this flourishing age of international trade and
458
business.
Understanding the conceptual origins of the doctrine, its intellectual
history, and the powerful jurisprudential and legal themes that have shaped
the doctrine leads naturally to a new conception of the doctrine. The
doctrine originally concerned the transnational recognition of sovereign
lawmaking authority. This recognition was based on the acting sovereign's
power to enforce its commands. Once we recognize the doctrine's true
conceptual origins, the next step is to trace the lost intellectual history of
the concepts that formed the doctrine's original foundation. The final step is
to restore the doctrine to its true foundation by building upon contemporary
principles concerning transnational recognition of sovereign lawmaking
authority.
An examination of the history of the concepts of power and absolute
territoriality reveals that they have given way to a more flexible and
thoughtful analysis. The recognition of sovereign lawmaking authority no
longer depends on rigid notions of power, but on a collective and considered judgment of the appropriateness of a sovereign's given exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law. This recognition leads to a new
conception of the act of state doctrine. Where a sovereign acts within its
legitimate sphere of lawmaking competence and not in violation of international law, all other sovereigns must recognize those acts even if to do so
would contravene the forum's local public policy. This view of the act of
state doctrine restores the doctrine to its origins as a principle of external
deference, and, because the doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe is federal
law, satisfies the Supreme Court's insistence on federal supremacy on all
issues related to the act of state doctrine.
An analysis of the act of state doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to
prescribe explains the results reached in most of the major act of state
cases, offers a better approach to act of state cases involving intangible
property, and can account for mistakes in the troublesome cases. In
addition to its enhanced explanatory power, an analysis of the act of state
doctrine in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe is also consistent with the

458. See Lowenfeld, supra note 332, at 325 (nations are engaging in more and more activities across national boundaries--trade, investment, communications, transport, financial transactions); see also Debs, The Development ofInternational Equity Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 5, 6
(1986) ("In the United States everyone talks about the 'financial revolution'.... [Recent] trends
will clearly result in closer integration of the major capital markets of the world-that is the process of internationalization.").
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growing recognition that mutual tolerance and reciprocal respect, not
power, form the basis for an international legal order among nations in the
modem world.
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